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Much is made of the ethical duty to protect attorney-client privilege. Both the
ethical duty of confidentiality1 and the ethical duty of zealous representation2 require
attorneys to vigorously defend privileged information from attempts to compel its
disclosure. The notion that there might be ethical limits to such a duty is hardly ever
considered and certainly not emphasized. For most lawyers, this emphasis on the
importance of protecting privilege and lack of attention to the ethical limits of such
claims has produced a sense that there is an unlimited ethical duty to protect privileged
information from compulsory disclosure. Indeed, many lawyers seem to think that they
are ethically obligated to give privilege the same level of protection given to criminal
defendants. Just as criminal defendants are presumed innocent until the government has
proven their guilt, lawyers often treat confidential information as privileged until the
party seeking compulsory disclosure proves that it is not.
From this perspective, a claim of privilege can no more be frivolous than a plea of
“not guilty,” even if the documents in question have never been examined nor the
relevant law of privilege researched. “Knee-jerk” claims of attorney- client privilege to
any information requested are seen not as merely strategic, but as ethically required.
Such conduct is buttressed by assumptions that the adversary system provides opponents
a fair opportunity to challenge claims of privilege. Taken together, these assumptions
produce “ an important and recurring problem in civil discovery--the improper assertion
of a claim of privilege.”3
In fact, neither the law of privilege nor the systemic realities of privilege litigation
support application of the ultra-zealous posture of criminal defense lawyers to claims of
privilege. In criminal cases, the legal presumption of innocence provides a firm
foundation for the ethics of presumptively pleading a client not guilty.4 In contrast, the
legal burdens for proving privilege are in direct opposition to a practice of presumptively

1

American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a) (2004) (“ABA M.R. 1.6) (“a
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client”).
2
ABA M.R. 1.3, comment 1 (“ a lawyer must . . . act . . . with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf”).
3
Eureka Financial Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 136 F.R.D. 179, 181 (E.D. Ca. 1991)(
“blanket” privilege objections that delayed production by five years sanctioned by waiver of privilege and
compelling production).
4
See ABA M.R. 3.1 and comment 3 (prohibiting frivolous claims and contentions but allowing “ a lawyer
for the defendant in a criminal proceeding . . . [to] so defend the proceedings as to require that every
element of the case be established).
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claiming privilege. In matters of evidence, the presumption is in favor of the compulsion
to reveal relevant evidence,5 and the burden initially falls on the party claiming privilege
to show that the information in question meets the multi-factor legal test for privilege.6
Thus, as a matter of law, it is quite possible to make a frivolous claim of privilege.7
Furthermore, courts that encounter such claims are more than willing to impose a wide
range of sanctions on attorneys and/or their clients,8 as such frivolous claims of privilege,
even when successfully unmasked, impose unnecessary litigation costs on both clients
and opposing parties,9 and use up scarce judicial resources.10
The systemic problem with an ultra-zealous approach to attorney-client privilege
is the fact that the adversary system does not work to fully test all claims of privilege,
with the result that some, perhaps many, frivolous claims of privilege may never be

5

See United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1389 (4th Cir. 1996)(stating that attorney-client privilege is
not “favored” because it “interferes with the truth seeking mission of the legal process”).
6
See e.g. von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2nd Cir. 1987)(“a person claiming
the attorney-client privilege has the burden of establishing all the essential elements thereof”); U.S. v.
Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982)(“ The burden is on the proponent of the attorney-client
privilege to demonstrate its applicability.”); U.S. v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983); Bouschor
v. United States, 316 F.2d 451,456 (8th Cir. 1963)(“one claiming the privilege has the burden of
establishing it”); U.S. v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir. 1979); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v.
Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 843 (1997) (“When a party asserts the attorney-client privilege it
is incumbent upon that party to prove the preliminary fact that a privilege exists.”). But see Edna Selan
Epstein, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE, 4TH ED.
38 (2001) (citing California statute shifting burden to opponent of privilege) (hereinafter “Epstein, THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE”).
7
See infra cases cited in Part III, A-C.
8
Id.
9
See e.g., Starlight International Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 648 (D. Kansas 1999) (noting that
“[d]elay and mounting attorney's fees can equate to prejudice”); U.S. v. Western Electric Company, 132
F.R.D. 1, 1-2 (D.D.C. 1990) (detailing the three year delay produced by privilege objections to hundreds of
documents that were “entirely without legal foundation, factual basis, or both”); Ost-West-Handel Bruno
Bischoff GmbH v. M/V Pride of Donegal, 1997 WL 231126, at p.2-3 (S.D.N.Y.) (describing the unnessary
costs incurred by opponent when three-quarters of documents withheld as privileged“were clearly not
covered by the privilege”).
10
See e.g., American Medical Systems, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg, Inc.,
1999 WL 970341 (E.D. La 1999)(a document by document review of approximately 2800 alleged to be
privileged documents revealed that a large percentage of the documents were easily recognizable as not
privileged, including blank pages and copies of reported cases). See also Deborah Rhode,
INSTITUTIONALIZING ETHICS, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev.665, 670-71(1994) (noting that partisan
practices such as unfounded claims of privilege both cause litigants to incur unnecessary expense and
causes the general public to bear the costs “in the form of higher prices, tax deductions for legal expenses,
and governmental subsidies for adjudicative and administrative proceedings”); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 398 (1990) (“[B]aseless filing puts the machinery of justice in motion, burdening
courts and individuals alike with needless expense and delay”).
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successfully unmasked.11 Opposing parties do not always have the resources to litigate
privilege claims document by document or communication by communication.12 Courts
do not always have the time or patience to review all such claims.13 Indeed, opposing
parties may never become privy to the facts that would allow them to successfully
challenge the frivolous claims.14 The ultimate effect of this loss of evidence on the
results of litigation may range from inconsequential to devastating.
The early failures of the tobacco litigation are an example of the devastating
effect of overly broad claims of privilege. As long as the tobacco companies successfully
resisted discovery of their internal documents as privileged, plaintiffs were unable to
prevail.15 However, once the privilege claims were examined in detail, at great expense
all around, it became obvious that many of the documents claimed to be privileged failed
to meet even the basic elements of privilege.16 Other documents met the basic elements
of privilege, but were ultimately released under the crime-fraud exception to privilege.
Plaintiffs were unable to make the crime-fraud argument in the early cases because the
11

Accord, Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting in Freedom of Information Act
case that the “lack of knowledge by the party seeing[sic] disclosure seriously distorts the traditional
adversary nature of our legal system’s form of dispute resolution”).
12
See Rhode, supra note --, at 669 (noting that “[i]mbalances in representation, information and resources”
can be “exploited” by partisan practices to “obstruct the search for truth”).
13
Ronald Motley and Tucker Player, Issues in “Crime-Fraud” Practice and Procedure: The Tobacco
Litigation Experience, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 187, 189 n. 10 (1998) (noting that courts were reluctant to engage
in the review of vast numbers of documents claimed to be privileged by the tobacco company , forcing
plaintiffs to choose small subsets for review with little information to determine which documents to
choose). See also Jones v. Boeing Co., 1995 WL 827992 (D.Kan.) (stating that “[i]n camera procedures
should be a rare procedure in discovery disputes” because “such a procedure requires a great deal of a
court's time and energy”). Accord, Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d at 826 (noting that the government’s failure
to meet its burden of proof when claiming FOIA exemption for hundreds of pages of documents shifts
burden to court system ill-equipped to handle it and creates likelihood that non-exempt material will be
improperly found exempt).
14
See Eureka Financial Corp., 136 F.R.D. at 183 (noting that when documents are withheld as privileged
but specific information is not provided to justify the claim, the opposing party cannot know whether “the
documents withheld under a blanket privilege objection were withheld correctly, incorrectly, or
maliciously”); Delaney, Migdail & Young, Chartered v. I.R.S., 826 F.2d 124, 128 (D.C.Cir.1987) (noting
that the party seeking information claimed to be privileged has a “natural handicap--an inability to argue
intelligibly over the applicability of exemptions when he or she lacks access to the documents”).
15
See Motley & Player, supra note 13, at 189 and n. 10 (1998) (“For more than forty years, the tobacco
industry avoided the discovery of its nefarious activities by hiding behind discovery abuse practices and
ill-founded claims of privilege.”).
16
See e.g., Minnesota v. Philip Morris Inc., 1998 WL 257214 at page 6 (Minn.Dist.Ct. 1998) (“Defendants
and each of them claimed privilege for documents which are clearly and inarguably not entitled to
protections of privilege.”). See generally , Motley and Player, supra note 13, at 189 n. 10 (1998) (listing
the “ever-increasing string of judicial decisions finding sets of tobacco industry documents simply not
privileged in the first instance”).
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fraud was only revealed in the very documents that the privilege claim prevented them
from examining. Indeed, it is by no means clear that these lawsuits would ever have
succeeded if the “privileged” documents showing the tobacco lawyers’ involvement in
the cover-up of the addictive and cancer-causing effects of cigarette smoking had not
been stolen by a disgruntled employee and provided to plaintiffs’ counsel.17
If the adversary system cannot be counted upon to effectively and consistently
unmask frivolous claims of privilege, an unlimited ethical duty to assert privilege without
regard to the potential legitimacy of the claim will have the effect of distorting the justice
provided by our courts.18 The punitive nature of sanctions imposed by courts on some
egregiously frivolous claims of privilege may not be sufficient to offset the strategic
value of successful, yet unwarranted, nondisclosure in the vast majority of cases. Indeed,
to the extent that ethical duties of confidentiality and zealous representation seem to
validate strategic, but frivolous claims of privilege, one can expect that sanctions will
simply be viewed as the cost of litigation that is both effective and ethical. Such abuse
has, in turn, led some to attack the scope of legal protection provided to attorney- client
privilege.19 However, if the ethics of privilege includes a limiting principle that makes it
clear under what circumstances claiming privilege is ethical and under what
circumstances claiming privilege is unethical, ethics can resume and maintain its familiar
role as a counterweight to strategic concerns.20 This Article will explore this limiting
principle and consider whether it can be incorporated into the ethical rules to provide
more balanced guidance to lawyers in their use of attorney-client privilege to resist
compulsory disclosure.

17

See id. at 190 (describing how a “whistle-blowing paralegal at one of the tobacco industry’s law firms”
finally made discovery of crucial documents previously protected by attorney-client privilege possible).
18
See Rhode, supra note 10, at 669-70 (1994)(arguing that “partisan practices” such as “adopting strained
interpretations of the attorney-client privilege” can prevent a “fair adversarial contest”).
19
See Report of ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege at 1-2, 11 (May 18, 2005) (noting the
“policies, practices, and procedures of government agencies that have the effect of eroding the attorneyclient privilege” and arguing that abuse of the privilege “as a tactic to delay and hinder the discovery of
otherwise discoverable material . . . do[es] not justify encroaching upon the protections afforded by the
privilege”).
20
See id. at 11 (arguing that control of privilege abuse should occur through ethical rules and sanctions
under procedural rules, rather than by limiting the legal protection provided to privlege, and suggesting that
existing rules are sufficient).
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This is a difficult undertaking for three rather different reasons. First, attorneyclient privilege is central to the American system of justice.21 Our protection of
confidential client communications through privilege is premised on the assumption that
this is essential to vigorous representation of clients. 22 Changes to the ethical rules that
undermined attorney-client privilege would therefore undermine the very role that legal
ethics seeks to define and defend. Thus, any ethical limitation on assertions of attorneyclient privilege must have a negligible effect on legitimately protected communications.
This Article will show both that ethical limitations on the assertion of attorney-client
privilege will not undermine the ethical duty of protecting privileged information and that
useful guidance about impermissible claims of privilege can be provided to attorneys.
The attempt to provide specific guidance regarding frivolous claims of privilege
reveals the second difficulty in this undertaking. If what is unethical is only the frivolous
claim of privilege, is the law of privilege clear about what claims of privilege are
frivolous? The very description of a claim as frivolous presumes a clear and
unmistakable lack of legal merit. We must consider what, if any, claims of privilege so
clearly lack legal merit that they should be declared to be ethically frivolous. Where the
law of attorney-client privilege is too unsettled, inconsistent or convoluted, it may be
impossible to declare claims of privilege frivolous and therefore unethical.23 At the same
time, there may be particular areas of privilege law that are more settled than others in
which identification of ethically frivolous claims of privilege is possible.
Finally, even where the law of privilege is clear and settled, determinations of
privilege are highly fact dependent.24 Is it possible to make lawyers ethically responsible
for evaluations of facts under the law? This will depend on how predictable such
evaluations are. An ethical limit on privilege claims can not be merely theoretical, rather
it must provide meaningful specific limits on when privilege must be asserted under the
21

See Report of ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege at 7 – 11 (May 18, 2005) (“the privilege is
an important and necessary part of our judicial system”).
22
See id. at 7 ( “[t]he privilege has an important role in (i) fostering the attorney-client relationship, (ii)
encouraging client candor, (iii) enhancing voluntary legal compliance, (v) increasing the efficiency of the
justice system and (iv) enhancement of constitutional rights”).
23
Accord, Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F.Supp. 558, 578 (E.D. N.Y. 1986)
(imposing minimum sanctions because “the very complexity of the law on antitrust standing makes it
difficult to say with assurance that any plaintiff's claim to have standing is obviously frivolous”).
24
See e..g., Glade v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.App. 3rd 738, 743 (Cal. Ct. App., 3rd Dist. 1978) (waiver of
privilege is a question of fact).
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ethical duties to protect client confidentiality and to zealously represent a client’s
interests. This could take the form of specific practical guidance to identify the kind of
factual support needed for a non-frivolous claim of privilege.
This Article takes the position that it is sufficiently possible for lawyers to predict
what will be a frivolous claim of attorney-client privilege that they can be held ethically
responsible for failing to avoid such claims. It proposes the addition of a comment to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct which will both alert lawyers to the ethical stakes
on both sides of attorney-client privilege and provide some specific guidance on what
makes a claim of privilege frivolous and therefore unethical.25 At the same time, a
comment to the Model Rules cannot substitute for legal expertise about attorney-client
privilege. What is needed is for lawyers to both develop and use judgment about claims
of attorney-client privilege. The development of such judgment can only be provided by
training and education. Thus, it also the case that attention to the legal and factual
analysis of claims of attorney-client privilege must be given greater emphasis in the
ethical training of lawyers in law schools and in continuing legal ethics education.

I. THE ETHICAL STATUS OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Legal protection of client’s communications to their attorneys began in the
sixteenth and seventeenth century as an accommodation to the honor of gentlemen
attorneys who would otherwise have been forced to violate their oath of secrecy by being
compelled to testify against their clients.26 However, the justification for the privilege
eventually shifted away from protecting the honor of the attorney to protecting the
client’s ability to obtain effective representation and thereby gain the full protection of
the law.27 In the absence of such a privilege, clients could only get legal advice by
taking the chance that their attorney might be forced to disclose secrets that would
25

Such a rule might serve more as guidance than as a basis for discipline, as frivolous claims in general
rarely receive disciplinary treatment. See Peter Joy, “The Relationship Between Civil Rule 11 and Lawyer
Discipline: An Empirical Analysis Suggesting Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers,” 37
Loyola of Los Angeles L.R. 765, 806-7, 814 (2004) (arguing that regulation of frivolous litigation claims
has and should remain primarily the province of judges rather than state disciplinary agencies).
26
Paul R. Rice, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2d ed., at 12-13 & n. 24
(1999)(describing the emergence of attorney-client privilege in sixteenth and seventeenth century England)
(hereinafter “Rice, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE”).
27
Id. at 12-13 (describing how a client -centered theory arose to justify the privilege in the eighteenth
century).
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otherwise never come to light; thus legal advantage could only be obtained by incurring
legal disadvantage.28 As such a trade-off would discourage legal consultation, by the
eighteenth century courts recognized that privileging client communications from
compulsory disclosure was essential to the rule of law itself.29 This same justification
continues to guide the contemporary American jurisprudence of attorney-client
privilege.30
The legal privileging of attorney-client communications provides attorneys and
clients with the ability to avoid both disclosure of such communications and sanctions for
failing to disclose in compulsory testimonial setting such as trials, civil discovery and
grand jury hearings. In such settings, the possible applicability of attorney-client
privilege to an attorney-client communication sought to be disclosed will trigger the
general ethical duty of lawyers to “act with commitment and dedication to the interests of
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”31 Yet for purposes of this
particular ethical duty, attorney-client privilege is just one of many legal rights or
entitlements available to a client that a lawyer must protect and advance. As such,
attorney-client privilege requires no more or less zeal than any other legal right or interest
and has no special ethical status.
The special ethical status of attorney-client privilege arises under the ethical duty
of lawyers “not [to] reveal information relating to the representation.”32 The purpose of
this ethical duty is the same as the purpose of the evidentiary attorney-client privilege: to

28

See Bolton v. Corp. of Liverpool, 1 My. & K. 88, 39 Eng. Rep. 614 (Ch. 1833)(“[i]t has been considered
so important that a man should take legal advice, and communicate with his legal advisors freely and
without apprehension of consequences hurtful to himself”); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470, 9 S.Ct.
125, 127, 32 L.Ed. 488 (1888) (attorney-client privilege "is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and
administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice,
which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the
apprehension of disclosure").
29
Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 My. & K. 98, 39 Eng. Rep. 618, 620-21 (Ch. 1833) (stating that “the interests of
justice” require lawyers, and that, without the privilege, “everyone would be thrown upon his own legal
resources”).
30
Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682 (1981) (“Its purpose is to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or
advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully
informed by the client.”).
31
ABA M.R. 1.3, Comment 1 (2004). See also American Bar Association Model Code of Professional
Responsibility [hereinafter “Model Code”], Canon 7, EC 7-1 & DR 7-102(A)(1).
32
M.R. 1.6(a) (2004).
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encourage clients “to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to
embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.”33 As some, although not all, of the
information relating to the representation will typically be attorney-client privileged, the
ethical duty of confidentiality requires that attorneys assert the privilege wherever
necessary to prevent the compulsory disclosure of attorney-client communications.34
Because this ethical duty implicates the ability of lawyers to fulfill their roles as client
advisors and representatives, it is a not merely a duty to advance the interests of a
particular client, but a meta-ethical duty to protect the role of lawyers and the system of
justice that is made possible by this role.35 As a meta-ethical duty, confidentiality
requires extra vigilance, because it is understood that the consequences of failure to
protect confidentiality will be to undermine the profession and its achievements as a
whole.

II. THE ETHICAL BASIS OF LIMITING CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE
Given that the ethical duty of protecting attorney-client confidences is located in
the foundational ethical duty of confidentiality, and is additionally buttressed by the
general duty to protect the legal interests of each particular client, it is easy to see how
placing any kind of limit on claims of attorney-client privilege might be viewed as outside
the ethical pale. However, there are at least two well-established ethical duties that
provide a foundation for an ethical limit on claims of attorney-client privilege: the duty to
provide competent representation to a client36 and the duty not to make a frivolous
defense.37

33

Id. at Comment 2.
Id. at Comment 3 (noting that the duty of confidentiality encompasses attorney-client privileged
information) and Comment 13 (“the lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all non-frivolous claims
that . . . the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege”).
35
Accord, Schwimmer v. U.S., 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 1956)(“the attorney has the duty . . . to make
assertion of the privilege, not merely for the benefit of the client, but also as a matter of professional
responsibility in preventing the policy of the law from being violated”).
36
M.R. 1.1 (2004) (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.“). See also, Model Code
DR 6-101(A)(2) & EC 6-2.
37
M.R. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”). See also Model Code DR 7-102(A)(1) - (2) & EC 74.
34
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A. ABUSE OF PRIVILEGE AS A VIOLATION OF THE DUTY TO
PROVIDE COMPETENT REPRESENTATION
In considering whether the duty to provide competent representation might
implicitly make some claims of attorney-client privilege unethical, it is important to
recognize that this duty is primarily client-oriented. Lack of competence is only a
problem, and an ethical failing, in so far as it results in bad results for a client. In the rare
case where a good result occurs fortuitously despite incompetence, discipline is also
appropriate under this rule,38 but it would seem to be based on an assumption that such
incompetence will inevitably produce a loss of rights for future clients, even if it has not
done so for the present client. Thus, in order for this rule to provide significant support
for limits on claims of attorney-client privilege, it would have to be the case that frivolous
assertions of attorney-client privilege due to a lack of competence would regularly turn
out to be prejudicial to the clients on whose behalf the objection is raised.
Because assertions of attorney-client privilege are actions rather than omissions,
even frivolous assertions rarely have the kind of direct negative impact upon client results
that a failure to file a claim within the statute of limitations or to read a contract would
have. Furthermore, inasmuch as frivolous assertions of privilege often effectively serve
to block possibly damaging information from either disclosure or use as evidence, they
will have either a beneficial effect or no harmful effect on the results achieved for the
client. In cases where the frivolous nature of the privilege claim is neither contested nor
revealed, it is difficult to see any prejudice to the current client or future clients.
If, however, the claim of privilege is successfully contested by the other side, the
client will incur the costs of responding to motions to compel disclosure at minimum,
and, if counsel digs in their heels, may incur further costs to respond to motions for
sanctions and to appeal both the privilege ruling and the sanctions. While the potential
benefits of preventing admission of damaging evidence might be worth incurring the
litigation costs of a non-frivolous, but controversial claim of privilege, this could hardly
be true when frivolous privilege claims are successfully contested. In such successful
contests, the most serious prejudice to clients of frivolous claims of privilege will likely

38

ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 3rd ed., at 3 (1996)(citing In re
Gastineau, 857 P.2d 136 (Or. 1993)(goods results do not excuse poor job of lawyer)).
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arise out of sanctions the courts may impose.
Sanctions for frivolous privilege claims can be imposed under a number of
different procedural rules and substantive laws, as well as under the inherent power of the
court. The purposes of such sanctions include: (1) deterring future litigation abuse, (2)
punishing present litigation abuse, (3) compensating victims of litigation abuse, and (4)
streamlining court dockets and facilitating case management.39 Monetary damages are
the most typical form of sanctions. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4)(A) requires
a court to award the moving party the expenses, including attorney fees, incurred by the
moving in making a successful motion40 to compel discovery. The rule permits the court
to compel such payment either from the client on whose behalf the frivolous claim was
made, 41 or from the attorney advising this course of action.42 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(b)(2) allows a court to award such attorney’s fees in addition to other
sanctions upon a party’s failure to comply with an order to provide or permit discovery,
so long as “the failure was [not] substantially justified.”43 Rule 37(b)(2) also provides the
court the power to require the resisting party to compensate the court for the added
expense of frivolous claims of privilege.44 Monetary sanctions in the form of a per diem
fine are additionally available under both court’s civil and criminal contempt powers45
against non-party witnesses who to fail to obey court orders, including orders resisted on
frivolous claims of privilege.
Should the client be required to pay these expenses as well as their legal expenses

39

RTC v. Williams, 162 F.R.D. 654, 660 (D.Kan.1995).
Success under this rule includes both the ‘voluntary’ provision of discovery after the filing of the motion
as well as a grant of the motion by the court.
41
See e.g. Prousi v. Cruisers Division of KCS International, Inc., 1997 WL 135692 (E.D.Pa.) (ordering
plaintiff to pay reasonable counsel fees and cost in bringing the motion to compel production of a redacted
fee agreement between plaintiff and its counsel).
42
See e.g. Jones v. Boeing Co., 1995 WL 827992 (D.Kan.) (ordering resisting counsel to pay opposing
counsel $500 for the costs of a successful motion to compel, where resisting counsel failed to even begin to
meet there burden of showing privilege).
43
FRCP 37(b)(2).
44
Government Guarantee Fund of the Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 182 F.R.D. 182, 186 (D.V.I.
1998) (also relying on the court’s inherent powers to impose a fine designed to compensate the court for
discovery abuse).
45
18 U.S.C.A.. § 401 (“A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or
both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority”). See e.g., Better Government Bureau v. McGraw,
924 F.Supp. 729, 735 (D. W.Virg. 1996) (imposing a $250 per day fine on an attorney witness who
continued to resist disclosure on grounds of attorney-client privilege after the court ordered disclosure),
reversed, In re Barbara Allen, 106 F.3rd 582 (4th Cir. 1997)(finding resisted discovery was privileged).
40
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in resisting discovery, the client will certainly suffer monetary prejudice as a result of
their attorney’s frivolous claim. However, if the court requires the attorney to pay these
expenses, the only negative monetary consequence to the client will be their own
expenses for resisting discovery,46 unless the attorney later passes to the client expenses
the court has assessed to counsel.47
Non-monetary sanctions for failure to obey a motion to compel may be imposed
by the courts in civil cases under F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2). These sanctions can reduce the
potential strategic value of asserting frivolous claims of privilege by providing strategic
advantages to the party properly seeking disclosure. These punitive advantages include:
establishing facts relevant to the non-disclosed information against the resisting party;48
estopping the resisting party from claiming privilege as to specified categories of
documents;49denying the resisting party’s discovery related motions;50 precluding the
resisting party from supporting or opposing specified claims or defenses or introducing
specific facts into evidence;51 striking out portions of the pleadings of the resisting party;
staying the proceeding; dismissing all or part of the action; entering a default judgment
46

F.R.Civ. P 11(c), F.R.Civ.P. 26(g), 28 U.S.C.A. §1927 ( allowing courts to make attorneys personally
liable for the costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees incurred as a result of unreasonable and vexatious
multiplication of proceedings) and the inherent power of the court to impose sanction for bad faith behavior
also allow for monetary sanctions in the form of costs, expenses and attorney’s fees under circumstances
that could include frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege. See e.g., Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Kimmes, (S.D. N.Y. 1996)(holding that F.R.Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. §1927, and the inherent
power of the court to punish bad faith conduct could permit a court to impose attorney’s fees on a non-party
deponant who had failed to produce non-privileged documents sought under a F.R.Civ.P. 45 subpoena
duces tecum and subsequently ordered to be produced, but finding such sanctions inappropriate in this
case); McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 275, 286(N.D. Cal.
1991)(sanctioning attorney under F.R.C.P. 26(g) & 37 for claiming privilege at a deposition after waiving
such privilege, sanctions to consist of re-convening depositions at opposing party’s counsel’s office and
requiring a $500 payment by the attorney to opposing party).
47
Courts can and do sometimes forbid counsel to seek reimbursement from their client for monetary
sanctions imposed against counsel personally. See Chilcutt v. United States, 4 F.3rd 1313, 1325-27, (5th.
Cir. 1993)(forbidding a U.S. government attorney from seeking reibursement from the government for
sanctions imposed against the attorney for groundlessly asserting attorney-client privilege to block
deposition answers and also stating that private attorneys may be treated similarly).
48
F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A). See e.g., Amway Corp. v. The Procter & Gamble Co., 201 WL 1818698 (W.D.
Mich. 2001) (magistrate recommendation of an order designating as established facts sought to be proven
by documents wrongfully withheld as privileged)
49
See Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., 1998 WL 257214 (D. Minn. 1998)(when a random review of
categorized documents claimed to be privileged revealed some documents “clearly and inarguably not
entitled to protections of privilege,” such abuse of privilege warranted loss of privilege for all documents
within that category).
50
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Levy, 706 F.Supp. 61, 67(D. D.C. 1989) (denying resisting
party’s motion to produce certain documents and motion to extend the time permitted for discovery).
51
F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2) B)

12

against the resisting party;52 and treating the failure to obey the motion to compel as a
contempt.53
While some of the lesser non-monetary sanctions do not necessarily lead to a loss
for the sanctioned client,54 such non-monetary sanctions will ordinarily be prejudicial to
the client. Similarly, when monetary sanctions are awarded, the extra expense will
ordinarily be borne by the client with no offsetting benefit. Even where no sanctions
occur, the client bears the extra expense of their own attorney’s fees and costs to resist the
disclosure. Therefore, in those cases in which frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege
are unsuccessful, there will almost always be sufficient prejudice to the client to find a
breach of the ethical duty of competence.
However, it may well be the case that frivolous assertions of privilege are a
successful tactic on the whole, helping more clients than are hurt. If this is the case, it is
difficult to place the ethical failing in question as one of competence. Only if the tactic
tends to be unsuccessful, and is more harmful than helpful to clients, might it make sense
to view frivolous assertions of attorney-client privilege as incompetence. Therefore, the
ethical duty of competence may not provide clear support for the proposition that frivolous
claims of privilege involve a breach of legal ethics.

B. ABUSE OF PRIVILEGE AS A VIOLATION OF THE ETHICAL DUTIES
NOT TO MAKE FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS OR DEFENSES AND OF FAIRNESS
TO THE OPPOSING PARTY
Unlike the duty to provide competent representation, the duties not to make
frivolous claims and to be fair to the opposing parties are designed to limit the
advancement of client’s interests. While the comment to Model Rule 3.1 states that an
52

F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C). See generally, National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 429
U.S. 639, 643(1976) (upholding a dismissal of the action due to failure to timely answer interrogatories
both as a penalty to the sanctioned party and as a deterrent to others who might be tempted not to comply
with discovery orders in the future).
53
F.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(D). Civil contempt provides the court with a broad range of discretionary remedies,
including imprisonment and punitive monetary fines. See Better Government Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw, 924
F.Supp. 729, 734-35 (S.D. W.Virg. 1996), reversed, In re Barbara Allen, 106 F.3rd 582 (4th Cir. 1997)
(choosing a per diem fine rather than imprisonment as a contempt sanction for a non-parties failure to obey
a court order finding no attorney-client privilege).
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“advocate has the duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s
cause,”55 the rule itself places the emphasis on the limits of such representation:
[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert
an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous . . .
.56
Model Rule 3.4 explains that the adversary system’s focus on evidentiary competition
presumes that both sides have appropriate and fair access to evidence.57
One clear goal of the limit on frivolous claims imposed by MR 3.1 is the
protection of non-clients from the negative legal, financial or emotional consequences that
such conduct can produce. Taking legal actions for the primary purpose of creating these
negative consequences is viewed as an abuse of legal procedure.58 Furthermore, since
“what goes around, comes around,” clients who might be benefited by frivolous claims
made by their own attorney, can at other times suffer the negative consequences of having
such frivolous claims made against them.
It is also possible to understand the MR 3.1 limit on representation as meant to
protect the judicial system itself, although this goal is not clearly referenced in either Rule
3.1 or its comments.59 This goal tends to be most clearly articulated by the courts
themselves as one of the important justifications for imposing sanctions on both parties
and lawyers who have abused the process in this way.60 The use of scarce judicial
resources by frivolous claims and defenses slows the judicial process. This, in turn, hurts
the quality of justice for both civil and criminal litigants, as justice merely delayed for
some is justice lost for others.

54

For example, defendant, Procter & Gamble, sanctioned by establishing certain facts claimed by plaintiff
as proved in Amway Corp v. Procter & Gamble, supra note 49, later prevailed in the case. Amway Corp. v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 346 F.3d 180, 181 (6th Cir. 2003).
55
M.R. 3.1, Comment 1.
56
M.R. 3.1.
57
M.R. 3.4 Comment 1 and 2 (2004).
58
See M.R. 3.1, Comment 1(stating that advocates have a “duty not to abuse legal procedure).
59
If M.R 3.1 can not be found to have the protection of the judicial system as a goal, it might be possible to
find this goal in M.R. 8.4(d): “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . (d) engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the adminstration of justice.” Although the comment to the rule only specifically targets the
distorting effects of prejudice or bias on the results of legal proceedings, the negative effects of frivolous
claims and defenses on the system itself would seem to be another kind of prejudice to the system that
lawyers should avoid.
60
See RTC v. Williams, 162 F.R.D. 654, 660 (D.Kan. 1995) (noting that one purpose to be kept in mind in
determining the appropriate sanction is “streamlining court dockets and facilitating case management").
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Delay, congestion and grid-lock in the judicial system also tarnish the reputation
of this system as capable of producing just results both in the view of the public and in the
view of those who work within the system. This can lead the public to avoid utilizing the
system to assert their rights and lead attorneys to avoid utilizing the system to vindicate
the rights of their clients.61 The negative effects of frivolous claims and defenses can even
discourage qualified candidates for seeking judicial office, as both the frustration of
wasting time on frivolous matters and the resulting increased backlog of cases simply
makes the job less attractive. Finally, frivolous claims can lead to legislative hostility to
lawyers, legal rights and the courts, as legislatures seek to reduce the waste of taxpayer
money by immunizing various sectors of society from suit,62 placing caps on damages,63
and under-funding the courts.
The primary target of this ethical duty is the initiation of a lawsuit that has no
legal and/or factual basis. Clearly, this is the most harmful kind of frivolous action a
lawyer can take, as it requires the defendant to undergo the entirely unnecessary expense,
effort and stress of defense, and produces the most impact on the operation, finances and
reputation of the judicial system. Frivolous defenses to legitimate claims have a lesser,
although quite significant effect on both litigants and the court. At best, frivolous
defenses can simply slow down and make more expensive the vindication of rights by
plaintiffs. At worst, the increased cost of litigating may require the suit to be dropped,
may produce a less favorable ruling due to lack of resources for vigorously litigation of
legitimately controversial aspects of the case, or may simply cause a lesser settlement to
be accepted. Such increases in expense and diminishment of results for the plaintiff is
paralleled in the judicial system by increased use of scarce judicial and administrative
resources and a sense that the results of the process are less “just’ than they could have
been.
What is of concern in this article, however, is not frivolous claims and defenses,
but rather frivolous objections to or resistances to compulsory evidentiary processes such

61

Lawyers may choose mediation or arbitration to resolve client disputes.
E.g., a bill passed the House of Representative in 2004 banning lawsuits by obese customers against fast
food restaurants. http://www.cnn.com/2004/03/10/fat.lawsuits.
63
Twenty-five states now have medical malpractice non-economic damage caps, and similar federal
legislation has passed the House several times. http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/medicalmal.
62
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as civil or criminal (?)discovery, grand jury subpoenas, and trial testimony and evidence.
These are covered both by MR 3.1, as discussed above, and MR 3.4, which states that
A lawyer shall not: (a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence . . .
. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to . . . (d) in pretrial
procedure, . . . fail to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally
proper discovery request by an opposing party.
As is the case with many frivolous claims and defenses, some frivolous evidentiary
objections are revealed as frivolous and, therefore, have no legal impact. I would suggest,
however, that frivolous attorney-client privilege objections are, on the whole, much more
likely to prevail than are frivolous claims and defenses.
The possibility of a default judgment if one fails to defend against even a
frivolous action is sufficient to galvanize most defendants into enough of a response to
reveal the frivolous nature of the claim. Furthermore, even in the absence of such a
defense, a claim that is legally, rather than factually, frivolous may be so obvious to the
court that it will dismiss the action on its own motion rather than enter a default. In the
case of a frivolous defense, the plaintiff is already geared up to litigate, having initiated
the action in the first place. Since the direct consequence of failing to attack the frivolous
defense would be the loss of potential positive results, and the plaintiff already has
retained counsel and invested in these potential results, plaintiffs will, except in extreme
circumstances, both have sufficient resources to reveal the frivolous nature of the defense
and choose to use their resources to accomplish this end.
In contrast, when a frivolous objection of attorney-client privilege is made to a
compulsory legal process seeking evidence, it is not clear to the party seeking the evidence
how important or useful the evidence not disclosed would be to their case. Even assuming
that the party making the frivolous objection files a fully detailed privilege log64 with
affidavits65 or otherwise provides the required level of detail about the withheld

64

To satisfy the requirements of F.R.C.P. 26(b)(5), specified information is required to be included in the
log. Community Psychiatric Centers, 1993 WL 497253 at *4 (C.D.Cal.) (“a) the attorney and client
involved, (b) the nature of the document, (c) all persons or entities shown on the document to have received
or sent the document, (d) all persons or entities known to have been furnished the document or informed of
its substance, and (e) the date the document was generated, prepared, or dated").
65
See e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft, 2003 WL 21212614, p.2 (N.D. Ca 2003)(“In addition to a privilege
log, the party claiming privilege should produce affidavits describing the confidential nature of the
documents.”).
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evidence,66 only the party making the objection knows the actual content of the nondisclosed material. A privilege log will not reveal whether the evidence withheld is the
missing smoking gun, duplicative of other useful evidence already obtained, or entirely
unhelpful. As a result, the value of vigorously contesting the objection cannot be
predicted. Thus, even an objection that strikes counsel as obviously frivolous may not
seem worth the effort to have stricken.
Second, even though a privilege log with affidavits, or an equivalent, is meant to
provide the requesting party with enough information to allow a challenge to be made to
the objection, practically speaking, it is often not so easy to clearly determine, based on
the information provided, that a particular claim of privilege is or might be frivolous.67
This is why courts prefer in most cases to undertake in camera evaluation of withheld
evidence prior to ruling against a claim of attorney-client privilege.68 In the absence of an
ability to judge either the likelihood of success when challenging a claim of privilege or
the value of the information that might be obtained, counsel may simply choose not to
make such a challenge.
Finally, another disincentive to challenging claims of attorney-client privilege is
the fact that, in many cases, there is not just one challenge to make. Depending on the
volume of information requested and available, objections on the basis of privilege could
cover tens, hundreds or thousands of documents, each of which must be separately
challenged as not privileged. Even where a detailed privilege log makes it facially
66

A regular feature of many, although not all, frivolous attorney-client privilege objections is a failure to
produce any privilege log, or a sufficiently detailed privilege log. See infra, Part III (B)(--)
67
Mark Stein has described a similar phenomenon under Rule 11, which he calls a “hidden fact-violation.”
Mark Stein, Of Impure Hearts and Empty Heads: a Hierarchy of Rule 11 Violations, 31 Sant. Cl. L. R. 393,
395 (1991). This is where a claim violates Rule 11, under language since changed by the 1993
amendments, because it not well-grounded in fact and the contrary facts are either hidden from or not
accessible to the other party. Id. Those claims of attorney-client privilege that require access to the
privileged material to reveal the lack of actual privilege would seem to be a kind of hidden fact-violation.
Stein has argued that such hidden fact-violations “pose[] a far greater threat to the non-violator - and to
justice - than the obvious fact-violation,” for which the opposing party has access to the contradictory facts
and therefore has the ability to challenge. Id. at 397.
68
See e.g., Lane v. Sharp Packaging Systems, Inc., 640 N.W.2d 788, (S. Ct Wis. 2002) (holding erroneous
a release of documents claimed to be privileged without in camera review, but based only upon a prima
facie showing of the the crime/fraud exception); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Fuller Co., 1986 WL 12424
(E.D.Pa.) (“Where, however, the parties have been unable to solve their dispute over claims of privilege,
and especially where public policy requires protection of documents or portions of documents, Court
inspection is unavoidable.”); Avery Dennison Corp. v. Four Pillars, 190 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D. D.C. 1999)
(conducting an in camera review despite the lack of a privilege log, but noting that failure to produce such
a log can be treated as a waiver of privilege).
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apparent that no privilege can legitimately be asserted, the time and expense of evaluating
and responding to each of many individual privilege claims, any and all of which may be
of little ultimate value, can and does lead requesting parties to leave claims of attorneyclient privilege unchallenged. Thus, when we consider the consequences to non-client
parties and the judicial system of frivolous objections of privilege, we must include the
consequences that occur both when such frivolous objection are successfully stricken and
when no challenge at all is made.
The obvious consequence of successful challenges on both non-clients and the
judicial system is the waste of legal and judicial resources required judged the objection
frivolous. The proliferation of magistrates as essential adjudicators of discovery disputes,
some portion of which revolve around objections based on attorney-client privilege, and
the sometimes staggering quantity of objections which must be reviewed item by item
both by the requesting litigators and by the court in camera, along with the immediate
appealability of orders compelling disclosure,69 suggest that the financial cost to nonclient parties and the judicial system may well be considerable. While it is impossible to
quantify the extent to which the early diversion of legal resources affects the results
ultimately obtained by diminishing the legal resources later available to devote to winning
the case or maximizing the award, it seems likely that, for some requesting parties, even
successfully unmasked frivolous claims of privilege will negatively impact the quality of
justice received. For courts, the amount of judicial time that may be expended in disputes
about frivolous privilege claims, including conferences, hearings, in camera review, and
written orders, might be almost as much as that used by frivolous suits or defenses. Even
if less time is involved, resolving frivolous claims of privilege must be seen as adding to
those delays and backlogs that diminish the quality of justice produced and tarnish the
system’s reputation for producing just results.
So far, we have considered the possible negative consequences that occur even
when frivolous claims of privilege are successfully challenged. What are the
consequences to non-client parties and the judicial system of the considerable number of
frivolous claims of privilege that are never challenged or are never successfully

69

See id. at 4, n. 5 (“Courts have been reluctant . . . to conduct in camera inspection,” especially “where
the examination of the requested documents requires herculean labors because of their volume”).
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challenged?70 Certainly no time, money or scarce judicial resources are wasted by such
claims because the issue never receives legal or judicial attention. In these cases, the
frivolous claim of privilege has successfully prevented relevant evidence from being
discovered and offered into evidence, thus the negative impact is entirely on the results
achieved. The law itself is clear about the importance of admission of relevant evidence
to the truth-seeking goal of the judicial process: “because of the privilege's adverse effect
on the full disclosure of the truth, it must be narrowly construed."71 If a liberal
interpretation of attorney-client privilege cannot be permitted because it has too great an
impact on full disclosure of the truth, frivolous assertions of privilege that successfully
prevent disclosure must have an intolerable impact on the truth that emerges from the
judicial process. This in turn produces injustice for the individuals involved and
diminishes the social value of the judicial system in general.
It appears, therefore, that frivolous assertions of attorney-client privilege, whether
successfully unmasked or never challenged, unacceptably harm opposing parties, the
judicial system itself, and all those who will seek or need to seek vindication of their rights
in the future. Since the goal of these ethical duties are to prevent such negative impacts on
non-clients and the judicial system in the name of client service, MR 3.1 and MR 3.4 must
include a duty to avoid frivolous assertions of attorney-client privilege. Should it be
possible to describe some claims of attorney-client privilege as frivolous, it now seems
clear that such claims would be prohibited by MR 3.1 and 3.4. However, it remains to be
seen whether there are claims of attorney-client privilege that can be reasonably
recognized as frivolous without the benefit of the adversary process. The possibility of
early recognition is essential if the ethical rule is to be understood as prohibiting the
unlimited interposition of attorney-client privilege as an objection to an otherwise legally
compelled disclosure obligation.

III. ETHICALLY IMPERMISSIBLE CLAIMS OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
70

The reluctance of courts to do in camera review, particularly when the number of items to be reviewed is
large may lead courts to discourage full bore litigation of privilege objections, even when the parties
involved may be willing to expend the time and resources. Thus, even frivolous claims of privilege may
survive attempts to challenge by the requesting party.
71
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d 672,675 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted).
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As a general matter, it is possible to identify three kinds of conduct that we might
be willing to view as producing ethically impermissible claims of attorney-client privilege,
each of which may be viewed as frivolous in a different way. First, we should consider
whether claims of attorney-client privilege made for improper purposes should be viewed
as ethically impermissible. Such claims may be described as frivolously motivated
because they are motivated by interests other than the assertion or defense of legal rights.
A second kind of impermissible conduct might be best described as ‘lazy’ claims
of privilege. This would include claims of privilege made without ‘reasonable’ factual
investigation, such as failure to actually review a document before claiming it as
privileged. It would also include claims of privilege made without ‘reasonable’ legal
research or analysis as well as claims of privilege made without complying with the
procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5), such as a general
objection of privilege without submission of a privilege log. We might describe claims
made in these three ways as made in a frivolous manner, without regard for the need for
substantive support.
The final kind of impermissible conduct could involve substantively frivolous
claims of privilege. Claims that are simply factually insufficient under settled law and
claims that are inconsistent with existing law when no good faith argument is made to
change the law would be included here, even if such claims were not made in a frivolous
manner.
In considering whether any of these kinds of privilege claims should be ethically
impermissible, we have available a few sources of guidance. First, Model Rule 3.1 and its
Comments provide some definitional assistance. Second, we can examine the disciplinary
cases applying Model Rule 3.1 and its predecessors.
An additional resource would be the considerable body of case law applying those
statutes that authorize the imposition of legal sanctions for litigation conduct that could
include frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege. However, it is important to
recognize that although the language of the law may sometimes be identical or nearly
identical to the language of the ethical rules, it is not necessarily the case that the legal
meaning of frivolous and the ethical meaning of frivolous should be the same in the
context of privilege. The law may require attorney-client privilege to be narrowly
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construed to minimize its distorting effect on the truth- seeking function of the judicial
process, 72 however, our willingness to view a claim of attorney-client privilege as
ethically impermissible is likely to be tempered by the countervailing ethical value of
confidentiality. Therefore, we may choose to define sanctionable conduct more narrowly
in the context of ethical limits on claims of attorney-client privilege than we might in other
contexts.

A. CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE MADE FOR FRIVOLOUS PURPOSES

Most claims made for frivolous purposes are at the same time substantively
frivolous as well.73 However, it is possible that some substantively non-frivolous claims
could be made for improper or frivolous purposes. Thus, there would seem little purpose
in making a non-frivolous claim of privilege that was unlikely to prevail or, even if
successful, would produce only a small direct benefit to the filer. Yet, if such a claim
could also produce a collateral benefit or detriment, such as beneficial delay in another
matter74 or reputational or financial injury to the opponent, these improper purposes could
be the real purpose for making the claim. Would we be willing to view as ethically
impermissible claims of privilege that are not entirely groundless from a legal
perspective, but which are made for such improper purposes?
From at least 1908 through 2002, American Bar Association ethical canons, codes
or rules have stated that claims or defenses made for improper purposes are ethically
impermissible. The A.B.A Canons of Professional Ethics, propounded be the ABA from
1908 through 1969, required a lawyer to “decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a
defense when convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to injure the opposite party
or to work oppression or wrong.”75 In 1969, the A.B.A. Model Code of Professional
Responsibility replaced the Canons and stated that “a lawyer shall not: (1) File a suit,
assert a position . . . on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such
72

See supra note 5.
Stein, supra note 68, at 402.
74
E.g., In re Perez, 43 B.R. 530 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984) (attorney three times filed and dismissed Chapter
13 bankruptcy proceedings to obtain multiple automatic stays of foreclosure proceedings, despite the fact
that the debtors had no income and no ability to make payments as required by Chapter 13).
75
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 30 (as amended through 1969)
73
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action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.”76 In 1983, the A.B.A.
replaced the Model Code with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Up until the
2002 amendment to the Model Rules, comment 2 to MR 3.1 stated that an action would be
frivolous (and, therefore, prohibited under 3.1) “if the client desires to have the action
taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person.”77 As
variously drafted, these ethical rules seem to suggest that improper purpose alone could be
sufficient to make a litigation position ethically impermissible.
Not surprisingly, the issue of improper purpose as an independent ground has
hardly ever arisen in most jurisdictions that have adopted the language of either DR 7102(A)(1) or MR 3.1 because improper purpose and lack of merit are usually both
present.78 However, at least one jurisdiction has expressly interpreted this language as
making improper purpose an independent ground for discipline.79 In a few other
jurisdictions, no express position has been taken on the independence of improper purpose
as a ground for ethical sanction, but disciplinary sanctions have been imposed even in the
absence of findings of lack of merit.80
However, some jurisdictions have modified their Code or Rules to make it clear
that lack of merit is also necessary before an improper purpose would make an action
ethically impermissible. The 2002 amendments to the A.B.A. Model Rules of
Professional Conduct follow this trend and have eliminated the improper purpose

76

ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A) (as amended through 1983)
MR 3.1, comment 2 (2001)
78
See e.g., In The Matter Of Luther Cornelius Edmonds, 2002 WL 32396986 (Va.St.Disp.)(suspending the
license of a former judge who filed a federal case seeking $50 million in damages from former judicial
colleagues and court staff who had participated in a judicial ethics inquiry on that ground that the suit was
legally baseless and intended to harass). See generally, ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, at 317
(listing cases from many jurisdictions in which both improper motives and substantively frivolous claims
could be found).
79
See e.g. Matter of Levine, 847 P.2d 1093, 1100 (1993)(interpreting the language of MR 3.1 to mean that
“ if an improper motive or a bad faith argument exists, respondent will not escape ethical responsibility for
bringing a legal claim that may otherwise meet the objective test of a nonfrivolous claim”).
80
See e.g. In Re William Spallina, 1999 WL 33721626, at 13 (Ma.St.Bar.Disp.Bd 1999)(imposing
discipline based on, among other unethical conduct, filing a suit to attach and collect legitimate attorney’s
fees for representation of husband in a divorce case from a CD, thereby knowingly trying to frustrate the
award of the CD to wife in the divorce action); Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Finneran, 687 N.E.2d 405 (1997)
(sanctioning lawyer for, in a number of separate matters, filing cases, failing to provide discovery,
dismissing the cases, and then re-filing the cases, up to as many as five times, in order to get a favorable
settlement offer in the case, and describing this as a violation of OH DR 7-102(A)(1), but not citing OH DR
7-102(A)(2)(lack of merit) or describing the cases as groundless or unsubstantiated).
77
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language altogether from the Comments following Rule 3.1.81 This reflects yet another
step in the “objectification” of Rule 3.1 by elimination of subjective elements such as
motive or knowledge.82 This Model Rules deletion must be understood to limit the ethical
prohibition solely to claims lacking any merit from an objective perspective, with no
regard to proper or improper purposes. Under the kind of ethical regime proposed by this
latest version of Model Rule 3.1, therefore, a non-frivolous assertion of attorney-client
privilege made for an improper purpose would clear be ethically permissible.83 Thus,
there is disagreement among ethical authorities and jurisdictions concerning the general
issue of whether improper purposes are sufficient to make a claim ethically impermissible,
even where the claim could not be said to be legally frivolous.
A similar disagreement can be found in the interpretation of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 11 and 26, which are the federal procedural counterparts to DR 7102(A)(1) and Model Rule 3.1. These federal rules and the case law generated by them
have had an important influence on the ABA Model Rules,84 state procedural law,85 and
state ethical standards regarding frivolous litigation conduct.86 As the issue of attorneyclient privilege mostly arises in the context of discovery, the most relevant rule to the
issue of claims of attorney-client privilege would be Rule 26)g), however, most of the case
81

M.R. 3.1, Comment 2 (as amended November 2002)
See ABA Report to the House of Delegates, No. 401 (Aug. 2001), Model Rule 3.1, Reporter's
Explanation of Changes (explaining the deletion as justified because “the client's purpose is not relevant to
the objective merits of the client's claim”); Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 5th ed.,
Annotation to Rule 3.1 (2003)(explaining the change from Model Code 7-102(A)(2) to Model Rule 3.1 as a
move from a subjective standard which prohibited only “knowingly advanc[ing]” unwarranted claims or
defenses to an “objective ‘reasonable lawyer’ standard”).
83
See e.g., District of Columbia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 (deleting the purpose language found in
comment 2 to the Model Rule altogether), http://www2.law.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/dcnarr/query=[jump!3A!273!2E1!3A100!27]/doc/{@1860}?. California has not eliminated improper
purpose as ethically impermissible, but has required a lack of merit as well. See CRPC 3-200 (precluding
California lawyers from accepting or continuing employment if he "knows or should know" that the object
of employment is either (1) to bring an action, conduct a defense, assert a position, or take an appeal
"without probable cause and for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person,"
http://www2.law.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/canarr/query=[jump!3A!273!2E1!3A100!27]/doc/{@2258}?.
84
American Bar Association, A Legislative History: The Development of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 1982-1998 164 (1999) (noting that the objective standard of Rule 3.1 "was adopted
rather than one based on the concepts 'harass' or 'maliciously injure' to track the standard generally used and
defined in the law of procedure").
85
Georgene M. Vairo, RULE ELEVEN SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES AND
PREVENTIVE MEASURES, 3rd ed., 40 (2004)(“Most states have adopted a sanctions tool like Rule 11.”).
82
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law on the independence of improper purpose as a ground for sanctions has arisen in the
context of Rule 11. Since most courts treat Rule 11 and Rule 26(g) as parallel provisions,
87

the Rule 11 case law should be instructive as to Rule 26(g) sanctions as well. 88
Rule 26 states that the required signature of attorneys to discovery requests,

responses and objections
constitutes a certification that . . .the request, response, or objection
is :
(A) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law; and
(B) not interposed for any improper purpose . . . ; and
(C) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive
[emphasis added].89
FRCP 26(g)(3) allows sanctions when such certifying signatures are made “without
substantial justification . . . in violation of the rule.”90 As drafted, it would seem that an
improper certification as to either FRCP 26(g)(2)(A), (B), or (C) would be sufficient to
violate FRCP 26(g)(2).
Similarly, Rule 11 states that presentation to the court91 of “a pleading, written
motion or other paper”92 is at the same time certification that, among other things,
to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, --(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation[.]93
Improper purposes under Rule 11(1) are found when a party takes an action “not in order
to prevail on the paper filed, but in order to obtain some other, unjustified benefit.”94
86

See e.g., Levine, 847 P.2d at 1100 (analyzing the treatment of motive in the context of civil sanctions as
relevant to the intepretation of ethical frivolous standards and concluding that there was “a common theme
in both our procedural and ethical rules”).
87
E.g., In Re Byrd, Inc., 927 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1991)(noting the intentionally parallel structures of Rule
11 and 26(g)).
88
See generally, Vairo, RULE 11 SANCTIONS 744-45 (suggesting that much of Rule 11 analysis is
relevant to Rule 26(g), with certain exception not relevant to this analysis, such a mandatory or
discretionary sanctions, who may be sanctioned and the nature of sanctions).
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F.R.C.P. 26(g)(2)
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F.R.C.P. 26(g)(3)
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Presenting includes “signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating.” F.R.C.P. 11(b).
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Id.
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F.R C.P 11(b)
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Stein, Impure Hearts, supra note 68, at 404.

24

Usually it is clear the party does not seek to prevail because the claim is also obviously
frivolous and the party knows that it will not benefit directly from this legal action.95
Despite clear language in both rules that an improper purpose makes even
substantively non-frivolous claims impermissible, the issue of whether courts may in fact
impose sanctions for improper purpose alone has been particularly difficult for courts to
accept in the context of Rule 11. Many circuits have refused to find sanctions appropriate
under Rule 11 for colorable complaints in which both proper purposes of vindicating legal
rights and improper purposes may be combined.96 At the same time, most circuits have
approved sanctions for even well-grounded motions or other non-complaint filings that are
abusive or seen as serving an improper purpose.97 Since almost all claims of attorneyclient privilege are defensive, it would be rare that such claims would be part of a
complaint. As a result, claims of attorney-client privilege would seem to fall within the
scope of those litigation actions that many courts would view as sanctionable under Rules
11 or 26(g). There is, however, a dearth of case law considering the actual application of
sanctions under either of these rules to colorable claims of attorney-client privilege made
for improper purposes.
95

Id. at 402.
See e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees, Inc. v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees, 844 F.2d 216, 223 (5tth
Cir. 1988)(“the Rule 11 injunction against harassment does not exact of those who file pleadings an
undiluted desire for just deserts”); Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450(2nd Cir. 1995)(sanctions could
not be imposed under Rule 11 for the filing of a complaint that was not substantively frivolous but was
dismissed on forum non conveniens ground and won for the plaintiff an assurance of safe passage in Israel
to testify in a parallel action filed against him there), cert. denied sub nom, Bank of Isr. v. Lewin, 516 U.S.
916; Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the vindication of
rights at issue in a complaint that is well grounded in fact and law cannot be tainted by any additional
improper purposes). But see Senese v. Chicago Area I.B. of T. Pension Fund, 237 F.3d 819, 826 (7th Cir.
2001)(stating that “Rule 11 may be violated when, even if the claims are well based in fact and law, parties
or their attorneys bring the action for an improper purpose” but deferring to the trial court’s finding that an
improper purpose was not present in this case); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990)(noting
that a complaint filed to vindicate rights in court, and also for some improper purpose, should not be
sanctioned so long as the added purpose is not undertaken in bad faith and is not so excessive as to
eliminate a proper purpose), cert. denied, Kunstler v. Britt, 499 U.S. 969, (S.Ct 1991);
97
See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Medical, 855 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1988)(holding that non-frivolous
motions filed to harass or delay as a part of abusive litigation tactics could be sanctioned under the
improper purpose clause of Rule 11 alone, even though a non-frivolous complaint filed for an improper
purpose could not be sanctioned under Rule 11); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 518 (stating that filing well
grounded motions can be sanctioned as harassment if excessive or filed without a sincere intent to pursue);
Whitehead v. Food Max of Mississippi, Inc, 332 F.3d 796, 805 (5th Cir. 2003)(holding an objectively
ascertainable improper purpose sufficient to justify Rule 11 sanctions even when an action is “well
grounded in fact and law”); Pathe Computer Control Systems Corp. v. Kinmont industries, Inc., 955 F.2d
94, 97 (1st. Cir. 1992)(affirming sanctions for removal motion that could not be said to be legally
unwarranted, but which was filed for the improper purpose of delay).
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Although there is legal support, and 94 years of ethical support, for generally
imposing disciplinary sanctions on even non-frivolous motions, filings, and discovery
actions, we must now consider whether it would make ethical sense to specifically impose
disciplinary sanctions on non-frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege for improper
purposes. Once the issue is limited to claims of attorney-client privilege, it quickly
becomes apparent that colorable claims of privilege cannot be sufficiently tainted by
improper purposes to justify the chilling effect disciplinary sanctions would provide.
To begin with, attorney-client privilege claims are purely defensive in nature,
unlike maliciously made, but legally grounded, offensive acts such as filing a lawsuit or
making a discovery request. As a result, the possible improper purposes that might be
associated with a claim of privilege are likely to be considerably more tame than those that
might be associated with the initiation of a lawsuit or even a request for discovery.
Imagine an attorney served with a request for documents that clearly target some that are
unquestionably privileged, but that contain nothing that would help the requesting party.
It is difficult to see how an objection of attorney-client privilege alone could serve the
usual malicious improper purposes such as ruining a personal or financial reputation,98
tying up the sale of property,99 or causing deep emotional distress.100 At most, we might
have a situation where blocking the discovery of th documents might be made with the
purpose of intent of annoying and frustrating the other side and/or perhaps triggering an
expensive fight about the documents that will drain their opponent’s resources and
resolve. These purposes clearly fall short of the more malicious purposes that have been
seen as sufficient to overcome the non-frivolous nature of the claims.
In addition to the fact that the improper purposes that might motivate nonfrivolous claims of privilege are more strategic than malicious, it is also important to
realize that in many cases, there is a a very important legal reason why non-frivolous
98

E.g., Whitehead, 332 F.3d at 801 (sanctioning an attorney’s staged for television execution of a writ of
judgment at a local Kmart for a $3.4 million judgment as undertaken both to embarrass Kmart and create
free publicity for the lawyer); In the Matter of Luther Cornelius Edmonds, 2002 WL 32396986
(Va.St.Disp.)(Virginia State Bar Discipliinary Board Docket No. 00-022-1227, May 15, 2002) (finding an
improper purpose where a former judge instituted a federal racial discrimination suit against a sitting judge
who had ruled against his wife in a commercial matter).
99
In re Perez, 43 B.R. 530 (Bank. S.D. Tex. 1984)(filing repeated Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions to obtain
repeated stays of foreclosure).
100
E.g., Argentieri v. Fisher Landscapes, Inc., 15 F.Supp.2d 55, at 62 n.9 (D. Ma. 1998)(claiming a motion
for attachment was filed solely to give defendant’s wife “apoplexy”).
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claims of privilege should be asserted regardless of the lack of harm to the client if the
requested communication was provided. Failure to assert privilege can create a waiver of
privilege for other communications on the same subject that could be disadvantageous to
the client.101 In cases where such a waiver would harm the client, the proper purpose
makes any improper purpose collateral at most.
Perhaps there are cases where a waiver is either not possible or not harmful to a
client. Is there still a proper purpose sufficient to outweigh the concerns we have about
these strategic but improper purposes? Legally successful claims of privilege defend the
attorney-client relationship and the adversarial system of justice that depends on this
relationship. It seems obvious that the ethical duty of confidentiality requires protection
of the attorney-client relationship by non-disclosure whenever and wherever the
relationship is actually targeted. This defense is so important from an ethical perspective
that it is unimaginable that an improper purpose for making this defense would change our
valuation of the defense. When it comes to legally supportable assertions of attorneyclient privilege asserted for improper purposes, it may be fair to say that they do resemble
not-guilty pleas in criminal defense cases. Just as we cannot imagine a collateral reason
for pleading not guilty that would undermine the defense of liberty embodied in all such
pleas, we cannot also imagine a collateral reason for denying access to possibly attorneyclient privileged materials that would undermine the defense of the adversary system
provided by protecting attorney-client privilege. Consequently, any ethical limitation on
assertions of attorney-client privilege should not extend to legitimate assertions made for
improper purposes. Therefore, in the context of claims of attorney-client privilege, the
move made in the 2002 amendments to Model Rule 3.1 to eliminate improper purpose as a
species of frivolousness can be seen as consistent with the underlying principles of legal
ethics. Therefore, the Model Rule of Attorney-client Privilege proposed here would not
define a frivolous claim of attorney-client privilege as including a claim made for an
improper purpose.

B. CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE MADE IN A FRIVOLOUS MANNER
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Epstein, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 299, 378.
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Earlier we described three kinds of ‘lazy’ claims of privilege: claims made
without ‘reasonable’ factual investigation, claims made without ‘reasonable’ legal
research or analysis, and claims made without complying with the procedural
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5). When such laziness produces
substantively frivolous claims of privilege, the lack of merit alone may well suffice to
make such claims ethically impermissible.102 At issue in this section is whether making
claims of privilege in a frivolous manner should be an ethical violation even when the
claim turns out to be either colorable or meritorious.
1. LACK OF FACTUAL INQUIRY
The most extreme example of claim made in a factually frivolous manner would
arise if a lawyer claimed attorney-client privilege for documents that the lawyer had not
personally sent or received without ever reviewing the documents for the presence or
absence of facts that would support a claim of privilege.103
The ethical duty of competence under Model Rule 1.1 requires that “[a] lawyer . .
. provide . . . [the] preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”104 Such
preparation includes “inquiry into and analysis of the factual . . . elements of the
problem.”105 Thus, lawyers have been disciplined for failing to obtain and review bank
records that would have prevented a conservatorship being unnecessarily imposed on an
elderly client,106 for failing to obtain and review medical reports in a murder case,107 for
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See infra, section III, C.
See e.g., American Medical Systems, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA., 1999
WL 816300, at 6, 9 (E.D.La.) (awarding attorney’s fees for “completely inappropriate” claim of privilege,
including for copies of folder labels, blank pieces of paper, and copies of reported cases). See also Eureka
Financial Corp., 136 F.R.D. at 183, n.9 (suggesting that improper “blanket” claims of privilege are most
often made by counsel “who have not properly reviewed the documents for privilege”).
104
M.R. 1.1. This language is quite similar to DR 6-101(A)(2) of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires a lawyer not to “[h]andle a legal matter without preparation adequate under
the circumstances”).
105
M.R. 1.1., comment 5. It is worth noting that the Model Code fails to mention factual inquiry in either
the DR itself or the Ethical Considerations that precede the rule. An increasing emphasis on factual
investigation can be most clearly seen in the movement from DR 7-102(A) to Model Rule 3.1 and in the
most recent amendments to MR 3.1. See infra. Further support for a general duty to undertake a factual
review of documents prior to claiming privilege may also be found in MR 3.4, which prohibits a lawyer
from “fail[ing] to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an
opposing party.”105 Clearly, the first step in a reasonably diligent effort to comply would be factual review
of documents that might be within the scope of the request.
106
In the Matter of Brantley, 920 P.2d 433, 441-2 (S.Ct. Ka. 1996)(before filing for conservatorship for
elderly client, lawyer failed to verify that client did not know of bank transfers to son reported by bank
official by checking bank records and showing client these records).
103
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failing to read client statement or contact potential witnesses,108 and for failing to read
grand jury transcripts or examine physical evidence.109 Understandably, these disciplinary
cases under MR 1.1 have tended to involve failures to investigate facts central to the
success and failure of the claims and defenses of clients. Indeed, Rule 1.1 would seem to
be aimed at failures to factually investigate that are likely to directly lead to loss of client
rights. Thus, in such cases, courts are willing to say that good results, should they occur,
do not excuse the lack of preparation on the part of the lawyer because the good results are
not really produced by the representation itself, but by some independent factor.110
On the other hand, it is difficult to say that incompetence is present when the acts
or omissions may and do directly produce good results and can therefore be seen as
strategic acts or omissions.111 Clearly, if a lawyer fails to examine documents to be
produced, produces them all without claiming privilege for any of them, and thereby
produces some privileged documents, we would have a Rule 1.1 failure to factually
investigate that directly led to a loss of client rights. Indeed, we would probably see a
greater degree of competence at work if the same lawyer were to blindly claim privilege
for all the documents in this situation, rather than failing to make any effort at all to
protect the client’s privilege.

In this situation, if privileged documents are thereby

protected, the lawyer has directly produced this result. If detrimental information has been
withheld from the opposing party, the lawyer has directly produced this result as well.
There is a level of legal and strategic competence operating in such a practice that makes
it difficult to bring it cleanly with the scope of cases decided under Model Rule 1.1.
107

In Re Chambers, 642 P.2d 286, 291 (S.Ct Or. 1982)(lawyer suspended for, among other things, not
reviewing state held medical records in a murder case); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v
Mooney, 753 A.2d 17, 37 (Ct.Ap. Maryland 1999)(lawyer suspended for, among other things, failing to
obtain medical records or subpoena witnesses in an assault case).
108
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Ficker, 706 A.2d 1045, 1057-8 (Ct.Ap. Maryland
1998)(lawyer appeared not to have read statement given by client to assistant and did not contact any
witnesses named in statement).
109
In the Matter of Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 100 (S.Ct. Az. 1993) (lawyer suspended for failing to read grand
jury transcript, examine physical evidence, or interview witnesses in felony child abuse case).
110
See e.g., Wofram, 847 P.2d at 104 (noting that, although lawyer’s incompetent representation
ultimately resulted in an improved plea bargain after issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was raised
and a lesser sentence, and that this may actually have been intended by counsel, it was still unethical)
(concurring judge); In re Conduct of Gastineau, 857 P2d at 142(“If a lawyer does a poor job, but the client
fortuitously or through the efforts of others obtains a good result, that does not excuse the lawyer from
providing competent representation or justify neglecting the case”).
111
Id. (no incompetence when “the accused identified the most desirable disposition for his client and
deliberately was using the tactic of not getting in the way of a good result”).
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Of course, a failure to actually review documents would make it impossible to
comply with the procedural obligations of providing specific factual information about
each document objected to.112 At most, a general privilege objection could be made as to
all documents. Thus, the lack of factual investigation would necessarily lead to procedural
violations and a violation of M.R. 3.4, which is discussed in more detail below.113
Additional support for the proposition that failing to review documents prior to
claiming privilege is ethically impermissible may be found in the 2004 version of Model
Rule 3.1. MR 3.1 specifies that “[a] lawyer not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact . . . that is not
frivolous.”114 The comments add that while an action is not frivolous “merely because the
facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital
evidence only by discovery [, w]hat is required of lawyers, however, is that they inform
themselves about the facts of their clients’ cases.”115
It should be noted that both the reference to a basis ‘in fact’ in the body of MR
3.1, and the requirement in the comment that lawyers inform themselves about the facts
were 2002 additions to MR 3.1.116 Neither the previous version of MR 3.1,117 nor its
predecessor Model Code provisions 7-102(A)(1)&(2),118 made any specific reference to
factual investigation or grounding for litigation actions. Indeed, the overwhelmingly
subjective focus of the predecessor sections of the Model Code – prohibiting only the
knowing or obvious making of a claim unwarranted by law119 -- may have actually
protected lawyers whose lack of factual investigation made it impossible for them to know
the claim was unwarranted.
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See e.g., FRCP 26(b)(5)(requiring specific information about privileged documents be provided “in a
manner that . . . will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection”).
113
See infra., Part III(B)(3).
114
M.R. 3.1 (2004).
115
Id.at Comment 2.
116
Compare MR 3.1(as amended 2002) with MR 3.1(2001).
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MR 3.1(2001).
118
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(1)&(2)(1969)
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Id. at DR 7-102(A)(2)
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The shift to an objective test in the 1983 Model Rule 3.1,120 on the other hand,
was intended to bring the ethical standard in line with the procedural law of frivolous
litigation actions.121 Since the 1983 version of Rule 11 expressly required a certification
that the action “is well grounded in fact,”122 it seems likely that the previous wording of
MR 3.1 requiring a “basis . . . that is not frivolous”123 implicitly included a reasonable
attempt to discern the facts.124 The Reporter’s Explanation to the 2002 amendments to
MR 3.1 confirms this by stating both that the 2002 changes were not intended to make a
change in substance,125 and that the new language was added simply “to remind lawyers
that they must act reasonably to inform themselves about the facts and law.”126

At the

same time, Rule 3.1 is generally understood to allow little or no factual investigation if
there is no time to do so before an action protecting the client must be taken, such as filing
to avoid a statute of limitations deadline.127 It does seem, however, that this excuse is not
likely to apply to privilege objections to document requests.128
The crucial question under MR 3.1 is whether a lawyer’s pre-objection failure to
even read documents claimed to be privileged would be an ethical violation if, by chance,
the documents were subsequently determined to be privileged. Does MR 3.1 target the
frivolous manner in which the objection was made independent of the end result? Prior to
the objective turn in MR 3.1, this issue was described in terms of ‘objective’ and
120

See Center for Professional Responsibility, American Bar Association, ANNOTATED MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 5th ed., at 316 (hereinafter “ANNOTATED MODEL
RULES”).
121
Accord, American Bar Association, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-1998 164 (1999)(the objective test of MR
3.1 was developed to track procedural law).
122
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(1983)
123
MR 3.1(2001)
124
E.g., In re: George K. Kurker, 2002 WL 32254626 at 2 (Ma.St.Bar.Disp.Bd.)(under the original version
of MR 3.1, suspending from practice an attorney who filed a suit on behalf of himself alleging a conspiracy
between the judges and opposing counsel in a prior case involving his own interest in a family business
without interviewing any potential witnesses, investigating, or having any evidence or reasonable personal
knowlege to support the allegations).
125
Model Rule 3.1 Reporter’s Explanation of Changes at “Text 1,” http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2krule31rem.html.
126
Id. at Comment 2.
127
See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES 319.
128
A lawyer finding themselves with insufficient time to review documents for privilege and other
objections before a deadline to produce has passed should either have gotten to work earlier or can apply
for an extension of time in which to respond, rather than take a pile of unexamined papers and declare them
all privileged simply to protect possible client rights in a time crunch. Even missing a deadline without an
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‘subjective’ basis. A lawyer who believed there was no factual support for a claim has no
subjective basis for claiming privilege. If facts necessary to support a claim of privilege
were not in fact present, there was also no objective basis for the claim. If such facts were
present, there was an objective basis for the claim. The predecessor to MR 3.1, DR 7102(A)(2), required that there be both no objective basis for the claim and no subjective
basis.129 Thus, a lawyer that could show that they did believe facts to be present, even
though they had done no investigation and the facts were not present, would not violate
the ethical rule.
The turn to an objective standard in 3.1 was clearly meant to remove the
additional requirement that only a lawyer with no subjective belief in a claim would
violate the rule.130 If the claim is objectively frivolous, it is now no defense that the
lawyer did not realize it.131 However, it is possible to eliminate the requirement of
subjective knowledge, yet still require that an attorney engage in the kind of investigatory
conduct normally required to produce a subjective belief that there is a basis for the claim.
This is precisely what the 2003 amendments accomplished. Language added to the
comments emphasizes the conduct requirement that lawyers “inform themselves about the
facts” as an essential aspect of avoiding making a frivolous claim.132 Further, the ABA
itself has described MR 3.1 as including a “duty to investigate.”133 Whether this should be
understood to impose an independent duty to investigate, such that lack of factual
investigation of objectively factually grounded claims would be an ethical violation,
remains unclarified.
As the same issue has arisen under Rule 11, it may be instructive to the case law
dealing with this very issue. 134 The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 were adopted one day
before the Model Rules were first approved to replace the Model Code.135 These

extension is not going to have the dire consequences of passing a statute of limitations deadline without
filing a complaint.
129
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(2)(1969)(prohibiting the lawyer from
“[k]nowingly advancing a claim or defense that is unwarranted”).
130
Lancelloti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1990).
131
Id.
132
M.R. 3.1(2004) at Comment 2.
133
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES at 319.
134
See supra.
135
See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 3rd ed. at 300 (1996).
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amendments for the first time imposed a “reasonable inquiry”136 requirement on litigants.
This was designed to move the standard away from judgments about a lawyer’s good faith
in bringing a claim,137 which necessitated a focus on the subjective state of mind of the
attorney. However, two possible objective targets emerged to take the place of the
lawyer’s good faith. The reasonable inquiry standard could be read to require particular
pre-filing conduct by lawyers which would then immunize the result, or it could be read to
require a final product which could have resulted from reasonable pre-filing conduct.138
Initially, courts applying the 1983 version of Rule 11 tended to focus on the
product or filing itself and the issue of whether it was substantively frivolous.139If the
product were seen as either not “well grounded in fact [or] warranted by existing law,”140
courts presumed that a reasonable inquiry could not have occurred.141 However, using this
approach, courts have had great difficulty articulating a “workable test for
frivolousness.”142 Since it is easier to agree on what a reasonable inquiry should have
been than it is to agree on what result a reasonable inquiry should have produced, it has
been argued that courts should shift their focus to the actual pre-filing conduct.143 Indeed,
at least one commentator has suggested that the design of the 1993 amendments to Rule
11 was meant “to focus judicial inquiry primarily on the reasonable inquiry-conduct
aspect of Rule 11, rather than the content of paper per se.”144
Additional focus by the courts on the reasonable inquiry element of Rule 11
produced two differing approaches. Most circuits have adopted a two-part test, in which
sanctions may not be imposed unless there has been both a finding that a filing is baseless
and a finding that this would have been revealed by a reasonable inquiry.145 Thus, an
136

See Vairo, supra at 9 (quoting Rule 11 under the 1983 amendments).
Id. at 9, n.57.
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Id. at 244.
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Id. at 247.
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Georgene M. Vairo, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES AND PREVENTIVE
MEASURES, Richard C. Johnson, ed., 3rd Ed., at 247 (citing William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering a
New Era, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 7( 1994)).
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from being frivolous); Jones v. International Riding Helmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692, 695 (11th Cir. 1995)
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actual reasonable inquiry will immunize what turns out to be an objectively frivolous
filing and vice versa.146 A few circuits have taken the position that a pre-filing failure to
investigate the facts is sufficient to justify Rule 11 sanctions,147 even if “the attorney . . .
gets lucky in discovery.”148 Thus it remains an open question under Rule 11 whether
subsequent discovery of supporting facts should excuse the earlier failure to investigate.149
A major commentator on Rule 11, Georgene Vairo, has argued that Rule 11
should not be read to impose an independent requirement of an actual reasonable inquiry
where facts emerge to make the claim not substantively frivolous because the resulting
non-frivolous filing does not create an improper burden to the system.150 Further, the fact
that sanctions loom if the filing is substantively frivolous should provide sufficient
motivation for attorneys to investigate the facts.151 Vairo also points out that this approach
“limits satellite litigation,” 152 i.e., litigation about the litigation, which creates its own
burden on the courts. However, she does suggest that such failures to engage in factual
investigation are unethical, even if they should not be a ground for sanctions in
(stating the Rule 11 test as looking first to see if claims are objectively substantively frivolous, then
considering whether a reasonable inquiry would have revealed this at the time the claims were made);
Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1470 (2nd Cir. 1988.)(stating Rule 11 test as
requiring no showing of an adequate pre-filling inquiry if an objectively reasonable evidentiary basis for a
claim emerged pre-trial or at trial) reversed in part, Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493
U.S. 120 (S.Ct. 1989)(reversing only sanctions against the law firm after holding that signatory lawyer but
not law firm of signatory lawyer could be sanctioned under Rule 11).But see Lichtenstein v. Consolidated
Services Group, Inc., 173 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating in dictum that “a party who brings a suit
without conducting a reasonable inquiry and based on nothing more than a prayer that helpful facts will
somehow emerge, and who through sheer fortuity is rewarded for his carelessness, is nevertheless
vulnerable to sanctions.”).
146
Brunt v. Service Employees Intern. Union, 284 F.3d 715, 721(7th Cir. ,2002)(“[e]ven ‘objectively
frivolous filings support but do not compel an inference of unreasonable investigation’")(quoting Mars
Steel Corp v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1989)).
147
Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1279(3rd Cir. 1994)(“a signer making an inadequate inquiry
into the sufficiency of the facts and law underlying a document will not be saved from a Rule 11 sanction
by the stroke of luck that the document happened to be justified”); Lichtenstein v. Consolidated Services
Group, Inc., 173 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating in dictum, “a party who brings a suit without
conducting a reasonable inquiry and based on nothing more than a prayer that helpful facts will somehow
emerge, and who through sheer fortuity is rewarded for his carelessness, is nevertheless vulnerable to
sanctions.”). But see Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746, 759 (1st Cir. 1988)(holding
that when a reasonably competent attorney would have found non-frivolous legal grounds for a complaint,
the fact the filing attorney was not aware of these grounds at the time of filing would not justify Rule 11
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remedied later).
148
Vairo, RULE 11 SANCTIONS at 251.
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themselves.153 Thus, we may take the Rule 11 case law as recognizing the impropriety of
making a claim without reasonable inquiry into the fact, even as there is disagreement as
to the issue of whether Rule 11 sanctions are an appropriate way to express this judgment.
If we may conclude that the ethical duty to avoid frivolous claims includes an
independent duty not to make claims in a frivolous manner, by which we mean here
without reasonable inquiry into the facts, it remains only to consider whether such a
independent duty is in any way problematic in the specific context of claims of attorneyclient privilege. Does our duty to preserve the attorney-client privilege require that we
allow attorneys to make unnecessarily fact-blind claims of privilege because some of these
communication will legitimately require the protection of the privilege?
In fact, the danger of chilling the assertion of objectively non-frivolous claims of
privilege by independently prohibiting fact-blind claims of privilege is minimal. First, the
probability of a negative impact on legitimate privilege is quite small. Unlike improper
purpose, which may as easily accompany non-frivolous privilege claims as frivolous
privilege claims, it would be extremely rare for a truly fact-blind claim of privilege to hit
the mark.154 Furthermore, while an improper purpose probably cannot be ‘deleted’ from
the lawyer’s or client’s psyche to clear the way to make a substantively non-frivolous
claim, it is simple to remedy the lack of factual investigation and remove any negative
impact on privilege. All the lawyer need do is evaluate the communications before
making the privilege objection. Thus viewing MR 3.1 as containing an independent duty,
as is reasonable under the circumstances, to examine the facts surrounding the
communication sought to be disclosed seems consistent with both its emphasis on a
primarily objective standard and the recent elimination of improper purpose as a relevant
factor.
In addition, it is highly unlikely that making a reasonable pre-filing factual
investigation of documents an ethical requirement will result in lawyers choosing to
disclose communications rather than take the time to conduct a factual evaluation.
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Lawyers are already quite clear that allowing a waiver of privilege to occur in this way
would be an violation of their ethical duty of confidentiality as well as malpractice. The
only result of such a duty to investigate would be to further motivate reasonable pre-filing
factual investigation prior to the making of privilege claims. Furthermore, this motivation
will not be provided at the expense of further burdening the courts with satellite litigation.
Perhaps, as Vairo suggests, it might be inappropriate to award attorneys fees to the side
losing the motion to compel, but it does seem necessary to recognize in some arena that
the “winning” attorney acted in a manner that is unacceptable when inadequate factual
inquiry was made.
Thus, a comment to Model Rule 3.1 designed to focus the attention of attorneys
on the particular ethical concerns raised by claims of attorney-client privilege should
address the frivolous practice of making claims of privilege without reasonable factual
investigation of the communications in question sufficient to ensure that facts supporting
the basic legal elements of privilege are present.

2. LACK OF LEGAL RESEARCH OR ANALYSIS
As is the case with a lack of factual investigation, a lawyer’s failure to do legal
research or analysis will usually lead to the filing of legally frivolous claims. Holding off
consideration of those cases in which the claim is also substantively frivolous for the
moment, our focus here is on claims which are either meritorious or for which “avant
garde”155 legal arguments can be made, but are not made or dreamed up until well after the
filing, usually only in the context of a motion for sanctions.
The ethical duty of competence as defined by Model Rule 1.1 requires that “[a]
lawyer . . . provide . . . [the] preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”156
Such preparation includes “inquiry into . . . [the] legal elements of the problem.”157 Thus,
lawyers have been disciplined for incompetence under MR 1.1 or its predecessor, DR 6as “blank documents, letters to and from opposing counsel, [and] published cases” before objecting to their
production as either attorney-client privileged or work-product privileged).
155
Pathe, 955 F.2d at 97 (describing novel theories of jurisdiction argued for the first time to support a
motion to transfer at the sanctions hearing as ‘avant garde’ and sufficient to avoid being sanctioned for
failure to make a reasonable inquiry that the filing was warranted by law, but suggesting that the timing of
the legal research and analysis supported the districts court imposition of sanctions for improper purpose).
156
M.R. 1.1.
157
Id. at comment 5.
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101(A)(2),158 for filing a complaint without researching whether there was a legal cause of
action for the facts alleged,159 for failing to do sufficient research to discover possible
causes of action,160 for undertaking a probate matter without any research into the basic
law,161 and for failing to read a governing statute.162
In addition to undertaking appropriate preparation, MR 1.1 also requires that
lawyers have the “legal knowledge necessary for representation.”163 The interaction
between the requirements of knowledge and preparation reflects both the different paths
lawyers may take to achieve competence in a particular matter as well as the differing
levels of knowledge required for matters than are complex and unique compared to
matters that are simple and routine. A lawyer with highly specialized and up-to-date
knowledge of the law and a great deal of experience with similar cases may already have
the legal knowledge necessary and need little or no additional preparation in the form of
legal research.164 A novice lawyer may need remedial study and research merely to
master the basics of the law in an area, with additional focused research as required by the
particular legal issues raised by the client’s case.165 Alternatively, a novice lawyer or an
experienced lawyer unfamiliar with an area of the law can consult with a more
knowledgeable lawyer.166
In cases of alleged incompetence involving relatively basic matters, courts may
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“A lawyer shall not: . . . (2) handle a legal matter with preparation adequate in the circumstances.”
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Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings against Zautcke, 508 N.W.2d 387, 388-9 (S.Ct. Wis. 1993)(attorney
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therefore focus on a practitioner’s lack of requisite knowledge rather than on their lack of
research. In such cases, courts require lawyers “to be familiar with fundamental principles
essential to the practice of law.”167 In other cases, the lawyer may be viewed as failing to
“discover those additional rules of law which, although not commonly known, may be
readily found by standard research techniques."168
Yet a third aspect of competence is legal analysis: “[c]ompetent handling of a
particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of
the problem.”169 Thus, an attorney may know the relevant facts and law, yet simply
assume the result rather than undertake an analysis of the facts under the law.
Alternatively, the attorney may in fact undertake an analysis, but fail to adequately apply
the law to the facts.170 In practice, it may be difficult to distinguish these two failures.
The expected competence of lawyers with regard to the law of attorney-client
privilege has not been a matter regularly or deeply explored by courts in the context of
ethical discipline. Is the law of attorney-client privilege a “fundamental principle[ ]
essential to the practice of law”171 such that lawyers would be expected to simply know it
without doing any research? Certainly, a case could be made that competence in a lawyer
must include knowledge of the basic legal elements of attorney-client privilege,172
including how privilege may be lost.173 In the absence of this knowledge, an attorney will
be incapable of fulfilling their ethical duty to protect attorney-client privileged
communications,174 as that requires the ability to identify what is and is not privileged.
Furthermore, assessments of privilege may have to be made quickly when monitoring the
167

People v. Gordon, 607 P.2d 995,997 (Colo.1980)(lack of knowledge demonstrated by lawyer’s
attempted use of probate proceedings to transfer property owned as joint tenants with a right of
survivorship). See generally, ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, at 19 (citing to many cases indicating
that a lawyer must be “familiar with well-settled principles of law applicable to a client’s needs”).
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Id. (quoting Baird v. Pace, 752 P.2d 507, 509 (Ariz. 1987).
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MR 1.1, comment 5.
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See generally, ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, at 21 (collecting disciplinary cases involving
misapplication of laws such as the Internal Revenue Code, child support guidelines, and federal sentencing
guidelines).
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People ex rel Goldberg, 607 P.2d 995, 997 (Colo. 1980) (lawyer treated corporation as tenancy-incommon).
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See infra note 186.
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Such as by waiver or under the crime-fraud exception.
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See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Op.94-385 (1994) (“the lawyer has a
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(such as the attorney-client privilege, work product immunity, relevance or burden), so as to protect
documents as to which the lawyer's obligations under Rule 1.6 apply”).
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testimony of one’s client in a deposition or in the witness stand. The basic elements
should not be something that a competent lawyer needs to look up.
However, the privilege objections of most concern here, objections to written civil
discovery requests, are of a type that does not require ‘seat-of-the-pants’ knowledge of
attorney-client privilege. Thus, we need not be concerned about precisely where we would
draw the line between an essential basic knowledge of privilege and law that can be
learned or relearned by some study or research. It is sufficient to say that prior to filing
objections based on attorney-client privilege, attorneys need to have this basic knowledge.
It is the lack of such knowledge, combined with the recognition of an ethical duty to
protect attorney-client privilege, that will lead lawyers to make substantively frivolous
claims of privilege.
In re Ryder,175 one of the few ethical176 cases to involve an improper claim of
privilege, is a case that illustrates the consequences of a lack of basic knowledge about
attorney-client privilege. Ryder, an experienced private practice attorney and former
Assistant United States Attorney, transferred a bag of money he knew had been stolen
from a bank and a sawed-off shotgun he knew had been used to commit the crime from a
client’s safety deposit box to his own safety deposit box.177 Ryder kept the existence and
location of these items secret.178 Within a few weeks, his client had been arrested and a
search warrant for Ryder’s safety deposit box issued.179 When Ryder revealed to the
court that he intended to move to suppress the items found in his safety deposit box, the
court removed him as counsel, suspended him from practice before the court, and ordered
that charges be brought against him.180
At the time he took possession of the money and shotgun, Ryder thought that the
transfer would cloak these items with attorney-client privilege and that the transfer would
work to prevent the client from being connected to these instruments and fruits of the
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263 F.Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967), aff’d, In re Ryder, 381 F.2d.713, 714(4th Cir. 1967).
Ryder was a proceeding to strike an attorney from the roll of attorneys qualified to practice before a
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crime. Ryder is not described as having done any legal research prior to taking this action,
however, he did consult with a former Bar Association officer prior to taking this action,
and subsequently with a former judge/law professor, a current state judge, and a state
attorney. 181 So rather that doing research to supplement his initial knowledge of attorneyclient privilege, Ryder consulted with other attorneys.
If the advice Ryder had received had been good, his consultations with other
attorneys would have been an adequate replacement for initial knowledge or a duty to
research.182 It is difficult to tell from the opinion to what extent, if at all, he asked or was
advised regarding the application of attorney-client privilege to these objects. Much of the
advice he received was simply that he should not retain the money if he did receive it.183
The advisors may have been more focused on Ryder’s possible criminal liability as an
accessory rather than on the attorney-client privilege rationale. Based on his own
misapprehension of the law of attorney-client privilege, which was not cleared up by the
advice he got, either because the advice did not go directly to this point, because the
attorneys advising him were similarly confused, or because Ryder ignored what they said,
Ryder took and maintained possession of these items believing that they had become
privileged.
Ryder’s misapprehension can be traced to his failure to either know or understand
one or more of the basic elements of attorney-client privilege.184 Only communications
may be privileged.185 Mere physical objects are not communications in the absence of
some kind of oral or written communication from the client to the lawyer encoded upon
them.186 No non-frivolous argument could have been made in this case to suggest that
either the money or the shotgun were “communications.” Furthermore, the transfer of the
objects to Ryder was not for the purpose of legal advice, but for the purpose of
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concealment. Finally, even if the objects had been “communications” “from the client to
the attorney” for the purpose of “legal advice,” the transfer of possession was for the
purpose of concealing evidence from the police and assisting the client in the commission
of a crime.187 This would have triggered the crime-fraud exception to the privilege had
the privilege ever attached in the first place.188
In the opinion, the court mentions that Ryder improperly relied on two cases
involving documents held by lawyers.189 It is not possible to know whether these were
cases Ryder was aware of and relied on at the time he concluded that attorney-client
privilege would attach, or whether these were discovered afterwards and first argued to the
court by Ryder or his counsel in an attempt to avoid the threatened discipline. We do
know that counsel conceded at the hearing that privilege did not attach despite these
cases.190
If we assume that Ryder did not know of these cases at the time he took and
maintained possession of these objects, then Ryder may be viewed as an example of a
case in which the attorney failed to know or understand fundamental principles of the law
that a competent attorney is expected to know. Even if Ryder consciously had these cases
in mind when he determined that the transfer of the objects to him would make them
privileged, his equation of the documents at issue in these cases and the noncommunication bearing objects he was dealing reveals how important basic knowledge is.
Without this foundation, case law cannot be properly understood and applied to new
situations.
It should be pointed out that the court did not frame Ryder’s misconduct as a form
of incompetence because the standard for removing a licensed attorney from the rolls of
those admitted to practice before a federal court required a showing of misconduct that
was “fraudulent, intentional, and the result of improper motives.”191 The court found that
Ryder acted outside of the bounds of the law in holding the stolen money and shotgun in
violation of Canon 15 and rendered a service disloyal to the law in violation of Canon
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32.192 For the purposes of that proceeding, therefore, Ryder’s intent to hide his client’s
participation in this crime and his illegal acts in support of this purpose were of far more
concern than his ignorance of the law of privilege. However, it was Ryder’s ignorance of
privilege that blinded him to the illegality of his conduct and, thereby paved the way for
his illegal conduct.193
A practical problem that arises in the context of legal knowledge and analysis that
does not arise in the context of factual investigation is that it may not always be possible
to establish whether a lawyer was aware of a particular legal argument before a legal claim
was made, especially in an area of the law such as attorney-client privilege. Most, if not
all, lawyers have been exposed to some of the law of attorney-client privilege in law
school or during practice. When a question of privilege arises, a lawyer who proceeds
without any deliberate research or analysis might be said to be deciding on the basis of an
unconscious, intuitive application of whatever they had previously grasped about privilege
law. The same cannot be said about the particular facts of a case. A lawyer who has not
received this information cannot possibly have learned it before.
It seems likely that Ryder was proceeding on the basis of some knowledge of
privilege rather than total ignorance, but in his case, a little knowledge was more
dangerous than complete ignorance might have been. The fact that he knew something
made him confident enough to avoid the minimal steps of reviewing the legal elements of
privilege and analyzing the facts under those elements. It also may have prevented him
from checking relevant case law. In Ryder’s case, even the consultation of four other
attorneys, whose advice either missed the point or was ignored, might not have been
enough to prevent him from being viewed as incompetent.194
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Of course, it is not possible to rely on Ryder to establish that claims of privilege
made in a frivolous manner are unethical even if not substantively frivolous, as the claims
of privilege in Ryder were substantively frivolous. Ryder was not a case where in
hindsight it was possible to see that there was a non-frivolous legal argument that might
have justified advancing the claim of privilege. But Ryder does help us think about the
complex nature of legal knowledge, preparation and analysis as well how serious the
consequences of this kind of incompetence can be.
We can also consider the extent to which the 2003 version of Model Rule 3.1
would make merely failing to research the law of privilege and analyze the facts under the
law prior to claiming privilege ethically impermissible even when non-frivolous legal
arguments can be made. MR 3.1 specifies that “[a] lawyer not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact .
. . that is not frivolous.”195 The comments add that
[w]hat is required of lawyers, however, is that they inform
themselves about . . . the applicable law and determine that they
can make good faith arguments in support of their clients position.
Such action is not frivolous even though a lawyer believes that the
client’s position ultimately will not prevail. The action is
frivolous, however, if the lawyer is unable to either to make a good
faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the
action taken by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law.”196
The Rule, together with the comments, provides two distinct targets of approbation:
making a claim for which there is no non-frivolous basis in law (objective substantive
legal frivolousness) and failure to engage in legal research and analysis prior to filing
(frivolous conduct). However, there is little or no guidance in the text of MR 3.1 to clarify
whether a lucky stab in the dark is an ethical violation.
As might be expected, the vast majority of disciplinary cases under 3.1 involve
substantively frivolous cases in which no good faith argument is available to be

insufficient. Without associating the advising lawyer, the lawyer seeking advice must rely more or less
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discovered by legal research. 197 In such cases it is obvious that either the lawyer didn’t do
the research, did research but failed to understand what they found,198 or discovered the
lack of merit but proceeded anyway. When a lawyer blindly makes a winning claim or
even a losing, but non-frivolous claim, it is less obvious that they have done so “blindly,”
particularly if they correct their failure to do pre-filing research and analysis prior to any
ruling on the merits by the trial court. Thus, the disciplinary apparatus is quite unlikely to
ever learn about their improper pre-filing conduct and consider whether this in itself is a
violation of MR 3.1.
However, at least one court has found a violation of MR 3.1 where the lawyer
eventually articulated a “unique,”199 but good faith argument on the merits in defending
the disciplinary action, but had failed to make that argument to the trial court in his
response to a motion for summary judgment.200 Of course, in this case, the lawyer simply
failed to cover-up his lack of research and analysis as quickly as most lawyers would once
the merits were challenged. Had the lawyer put the effort into his client’s case that he put
into his own disciplinary case, we would never have known about the pre-filing lack of
effort. It is also not clear that the court would have been willing to find a violation of 3.1
if the good faith argument had been developed in time to respond to the motion for
summary judgment, as this would have made it available in time to try to help the client.
Most courts facing this issue in the context of Rule 11 have concluded that if an
objectively reasonable, i.e., non-frivolous, legal ground has eventually appeared, Rule 11
sanctions cannot be imposed, even though these legal grounds were neither known or
discovered at the time the litigation action in question was taken.201 This approach to the
Rule 11 reasonable inquiry requirement has been justified by the need to limit satellite
197
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ligitation, 202 as well as the fact that the possibility of sanctions for substantively frivolous
claims already motivates lawyers to engage in reasonable legal inquiry and analysis.203
Yet, at least two circuits204 have taken the position with regard to legal as well as factual
inquiry that "[a] shot in the dark is a sanctionable event, even if it somehow hits the
mark."205 These courts argue that this approach both provides better deterrence of baseless
claims,206 and “ensures that each side really does bear the expenses of its own case,”207
without creating a chilling effect on aggressive advocacy.208
In the ethical context, we have identified as our primary concern the overall
litigation impact created by claims of privilege that force opposing litigants to make fairly
blind choices about what information they will pursue through a motion to compel, that
divert financial resources available for the litigation, and that often deprive litigants of
information they are entitled to have. These consequences are present in what I will call
‘losing’ cases, when the information is not in fact privileged and would have to be
disclosed if the issue were actually litigated. Of these losing cases, only some portion
would be viewed as frivolous from a substantive legal perspective.
One approach to the ethics of privilege would be to follow the majority approach
to Rule 11 and require both substantive frivolousness and a lack of legal knowledge,
inquiry and/or analysis before finding an ethical violation, thus viewing the “legallyblind” assertion of non-frivolous losing claims of privilege as ethical. Such an approach
might be justified by the practical reality that we are only likely to become aware that a
finding that the claims are objectively frivolous as to the facts or law, no need to consider whether a
reasonable inquiry was made).
202
Kale, 861 F.2d at 759
203
See Vairo, RULE 11 SANCTIONS 252; Garr, 22 F.3d at 1283 (dissenting opinion).
204
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Mays v. Principi, 2002 WL 15704, at 4 (N.Ill. 2002) (quoting Mars that focus of Rule 11 analysis is on
input rather than output); Garr, 22 F.3rd at 1279 (3rd Cir. 1994)(position is dictum re legal analysis as the
case involved issue of lack of factual inquiry). See also Linda Ross Meyer, “When Reasonable Minds
Differ,” 71 N.Y.U. L.R. 1467, 1490 (1996)(arguing that the Supreme Court endorsed the Seventh Circuits
emphasis on attorney conduct when, in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 394, 401-2 (1990), the
court described determinations of frivolousness as requiring factual determinations about the pre-filing
inquiry rather than pure questions of law).
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Garr, 22 F.3rd at 1279 (quoting Vista Mfg., Inc. v. Trac-4 Inc., 131 F.R.D. 134, 138 (N.D. Ind. 1990)).
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positions--that Rule 11 does not jeopardize aggressive advocacy or legal evolution.)"
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lawyer has failed to engage in appropriate pre-filing legal research and analysis when we
realize that they have made a substantively frivolous claim. Thus, it might seem that
independent sanctioning of pre-filing conduct of this kind was of no value.
However, it is a mistake to confuse the reality of enforcement with the
appropriateness of a threat of enforcement with regard to behavior that is deemed
problematic. The ethical rule against knowingly suborning client perjury209 is similarly
problematic, as it is exceedingly difficult to discover when lawyers have violated this rule,
yet this has not suggested that the rule be abandoned. The most important question is
whether the conduct in question is in fact unethical, and only secondarily whether the
ethical rule creates the possibility of deterring the conduct.
When making “legally-blind” claims of privilege, the lazy lawyer is in no position
to judge whether their claim is truly frivolous, is a non-sanctionable loser, or is a winner.
In the absence of a rule that sanctions the conduct of making a privilege claim “legally
blind,” the lazy lawyer may take a chance either that no one will challenge the privilege
claim to discover its possible lack of merit, or that, if challenged, the claim will be viewed
as substantively non-frivolous. Given the fact that the opposing lawyer is operating in the
dark about the possible value of the information claimed to be privileged, and the high
cost of challenging many individual claims of privilege, the lazy lawyer might reasonably
see the odds tilting away from possible sanction. However, it is this same reality that
makes it clear how damaging to the fairness of the adversary system such behavior is.
Lawyers should at least be discouraged from strategic behavior that has such a significant
negative impact on the adversary system.
The ethical legitimacy of the second calculation, that the claim may be nonfrivolous, is more difficult to assess. The risk of sanction will appears less if lawyers
believe that the line between substantively frivolous and legitimate claims of privilege is
sufficiently unclear that good faith, even if losing, arguments are likely to be available if
it becomes necessary to defend an objection. It would not be surprising if many lawyers
did not in fact have this view of the law of attorney-client privilege. If this were true,
then there would be little ethical value in forcing attorneys to engage in pre-filing legal
research or analysis for attorney-client privilege claims. The reasonableness of this
209
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assumption will be considered below, and I will argue that, while there are some areas of
unclarity, the law of privilege is clear enough for a reasonably prepared lawyer to
determine whether many claims of privilege are substantively frivolous. This makes the
strategic choice to make a “legally blind” claim of privilege unethical because it fails to
avoid the avoidable negative consequences on the adversary system of making a ‘losing’
claim.
Therefore, lawyers should be ethically required to follow a procedure that might
ensure sufficient legal research and analysis when there is time for such a process, e.g. in
the context of written interrogatories or document requests rather than objections to
testimony. Such a procedure might begin with a requirement that lawyers remind
themselves of the legal elements of privilege, either by forcing the detailed recall of these
elements from memory or by reviewing an appropriate case law or treatise source.
Second, lawyers would be required to either be aware of those factual issues that require
additional reference to case law or statutes rather the basic formula, such as pre-existing
documents, organizational clients, client identity information, and information about
evidentiary objects the lawyer has moved or altered, or be prepared to research beyond
the basic formula in every case. Finally, lawyers would be required to consciously
analyze the facts of each claim of privilege under the relevant law before making the
claim.
The steps articulated above are certainly good practice. The issue, however, is
whether failing to follow one or more of these steps should be viewed as an ethical
violation. The issue is most clearly raised by asking whether such failures would still be
ethical violations if the claims of privilege were upheld as ubstantively meritorious. One
problem with such an approach is that it would forbid acting on a ‘hunch,’ or what some
might prefer to call an ‘educated guess.’ Attorneys intuitive hunches about the possible
legal viability of a privilege claim may be subtly guided by the thousands of cases and
arguments read and digested, even though not explicitly remembered, during their legal
education and career. Indeed, a competent lawyer should not be capable of being
ignorant of the fundamentals of the law of privilege. However, the question remains, is it
unethical to act on a hunch when there is or should be time for a real legal analysis.
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My inclination is to say that acting on a hunch is an ethical violation, even when
the hunch turns out to be correct and the information is privileged.210 Although the result
in such a case is good for the duty of confidentiality and good for the client, it need not
have occurred in such a frivolous manner. By failing to condemn the conduct in this case,
we simply reinforce the habit or custom of making reflexive privilege objections, which
may just as often turn out to be specious rather than meritorious. Furthermore, a focus on
pre-filing conduct rather than post-hoc arguments provides an essential counterweight in
an area of law where post-hoc arguments may be perceived as easily available.
Finally, making such conduct an ethical violation will not chill claims of privilege
or undermine the duty of confidentiality, because the ethical and legal consequences of
missing such a claim are too great. It seems unlikely that lawyers would choose to simply
disclose rather than undertake the necessary research and analysis, as this would be easily
recognized as a potential violation of the duty of confidentiality, which requires the lawyer
“to act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client
against inadvertant or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer.”211 Since it would be
concern for confidentiality that would motivate a lazy lawyer to prefer to blindly claim
privilege rather than blindly disclose in the first place, it seems unlikely that even a lazy
lawyer would allow privileged material to be improperly disclosed, even if it required
them to do work they would prefer to avoid. All but the most ethically reprehensible
lawyer would react to a specific ethical prohibition on blind claims of privilege with some
level of factual and legal analysis of the privilege status of requested materials.
Thus, a new comment to the Model Rules designed to focus the attention of
attorneys on the particular ethical concerns raised by claims of attorney-client privilege
should address the practice of filing claims of privilege without necessary legal knowledge
or analysis.

3. LACK OF A COMPLETE PRIVILEGE LOG
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Accord, Tuszkiewicz v. Allen-Bradley Co., Inc., 173 F.R.D. 239, 240 (E.D. Wisc. 1997) (requiring
payment of attorney fees for unsuccessful motion to compel when explanation of the factual predicates for
the claim of privilege at the deposition rather than in response to the motion to compel would have obviated
the need for a motion to compel).
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The third and final way in which a lawyer may make a claim of privilege in a
frivolous manner is by objecting to discovery requests on the grounds of privilege either
without providing any privilege log as required by procedural rules such as the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)212 or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 45(d)(2),213 or by
providing a privilege log that fails to fully comply with such Rules.214 Although the
precise informational requirements of privilege logs vary from District to District,215 all
logs require some minimum specific factual information. Thus, the requirement of a
privilege log ensures that at least some factual investigation of the claimed privileged
communication has occurred prior to the claim. Some courts also require a statement as to
“how each element of the privilege is met as to that document,”216 thus forcing legal
analysis prior to a claim of privilege.
Making a general claim that one or more documents is privileged without
submission of such a log is often a manifestation of a lack pre-filing factual investigation
and legal analysis.217 Thus, it is at least partially possible to ground an ethical prohibition
on asserting privilege without following applicable privilege log rules on the prior
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FRCP 26(b)(5)(“When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these rules by
claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation material, the party shall make the
claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or
disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other
parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.”). See e.g., Starlight International Inc. v.
Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 646 (D. Ks. 1999) (finding sanctionable misconduct for asserting attorney-client
privilege in a deposition without a privilege log or other explanation for refusing to answer questions).
213
F.R.C.P 45(d)(2)(2005) (“When information subject to a subpoena is withheld on a claim that it is
privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation materials, the claim shall be made expressly and shall
be supported by a description of the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced that
is sufficient to enable the demanding party to contest the claim”).
214
More detailed requirements for such logs are set out in local court rules and case law and typically
include “(1) the type of document, (2) the general subject matter, (3) the date and (4) such other
information sufficient to identify it for a subpoena duces tecum, including, where appropriate, the author,
the addressee and, where not apparent, the relationship of the author and addressee to each other.” Michael
Silverberg, “ The Burden of Producing Privilege Log,” 05/09/96 N.Y.L.J. 3 (describing Southern District of
New York Civil Rule 46(e)(2)(ii)(A) and case law). Courts may also require additional information such
the purpose of the document and a description of how each legal element of privilege is met. See Burns v.
Imagine Films Entertainment, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 589, 594 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
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F.R.C.P. 26(b)(5).
216
Id. See U.S. v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044, n.20 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that resisting party should have
made an attempt to demonstrate . . .[the] specific way that . . . particular document[s] fell within the ambit
of the privilege”); Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer Inc., 770 F.Supp. 1429, 1439
(D.Del. 1989)(requiring “description of the documents within its scope as well as precise and certain
reasons for preserving their confidentiality”).
217
See Eureka Financial Corp., 136 F.R.D. at 183, n. 9 (“All too often, the blanket privilege is asserted by
counsel who have not carefully reviewed the pertinent documents for privilege.”).

49

discussions of the ethical status of pre-filing factual investigation, legal research, and legal
analysis. However, even if these ethical prerequisites to a claim of privilege have
occurred, the absence of a privilege log places an impossible burden on the requesting
party to show no privilege in the absence of the information that might assist them in
doing so.218 Thus, it is the unfair and impossible position in which the requestor of
information is placed219 that specifically requires the attention of the ethical rules.
M.R. 3.4, titled “Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel,”220 provides strong
support for the proposition that making a claim of privilege with an incomplete or missing
privilege log is already unethical under the current Model Rules. M.R. 3.4(c) prohibits a
lawyer from “knowingly disobey[ing] an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except
for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.”221 Thus
attorneys have been disciplined under M.R. 3.4(c) for failing to respond to interrogatories
and requests for production.222 Since filing a privilege log, as defined by FRCP 26(b)(5),
local rules and case law, is such an obligation, a failure to do so clearly violates M.R. 3.4.
In addition, M.R. 3.4(d) states that “A lawyer shall not . . . in pretrial procedure, . . . fail
to make a reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by
an opposing party.”223 The comments to MR 3.4 state that the rule includes a prohibition
of “obstructive tactics in discovery procedure.”224 Since making a general privilege
objection without filing the privilege log that provides the factual and legal basis for the
claim may be viewed as a failure to diligently comply with a discovery request or as an
obstructive tactic, then M.R. 3.4(d) provides further support for the proposition that
privilege log failures are already unethical.
In the procedural context, many courts encountering violations of FRCP 26(b)(5)
or 45(d)(2) have been quite willing to sanction such conduct even at the expense of
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See Delaney, 826 F.2d at 128 (noting that an “index of the withheld material, summarizing, in factual
and not conclusory terms, the nature of the material withheld and linking each specific claim of privilege to
specific material” “helps overcome the . . . natural handicap” arising from “lack of access to the
documents”).
219
See Eureka Financial Corp., 136 F.R.D. at 183, n. 9 (describing blanket privilege objections as
“defeating the full and fair information disclosure that discovery requires”).
220
MR 3.4 (2004).
221
MRPC 3.4(c).
222
Matter of Gabriel, 837 P.2d 149 (Az. 1992); In Re Boone, 7 P.3rd at 283
223
Id. at 3.4(d).
224
Id. at 3.4, Comment 1.
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legitimate claims of privilege by summarily denying all such claims of privilege and
compelling production.225 Some courts, mindful of the harsh effects of such a
consequence, have tried to avoid “hair-trigger findings of waiver”226 by providing
resisting parties with a second chance to produce such a log,227 or imposing a different
kind of sanction.228
Although it seems fairly apparent that it is already an ethical violation to fail to
follow court rules and file a sufficiently detailed privilege log when making a claim of
privilege, it is worth pointing out this specific application of M.R. 3.4 is entirely consistent
with and does not chill the duty of confidentiality. When considering the ethical
prohibition of previous kinds of frivolous claims of privilege -- improper purpose,
insufficient factual or legal investigation, and lack of legal analysis, there was always a
concern that this might undermine the duty of confidentiality by chilling claims of
privilege that ought to be made. In this situation, however, one of the procedural
sanctions for not filing the privilege log -- waiver of privilege -- makes a failure to file a
privilege log a potential violation of the duty to preserve privilege.229 Thus, the duties to
preserve privilege and not claim privilege in a procedurally frivolous manner are
strategically and ethically linked together.
The proposed new comment to the Model Rules designed to focus the attention of

225

See e.g., In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 575-76 (1st Cir. 2001)(describing failure to provide
a privilege log as a “fatal” error resulting in waiver of the privilege); Dorf & Stanton Communications v.
Molson Breweries, 100 F.3rd 919, 923 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(applying Second Circuit law to affirm a waiver of
privilege for failing to file a complete privilege log in violation of 45(d)(2)); Cabot v. United States, 35
Fed. Cl. 442, 446 (Fed. Cl. 1996) (ordering production of documents when justification for claims of
privilege ordered under Federal Claims Court rules was not provided); Williams v. Sprint/United
Management Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 653-54 (D.Kan. 2005) (a waiver of possibly privileged metadata
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See e.g., Hobley v. Chicago Police Commander Jon Burge, 2003 WL 22682362, at p. 5 (N.D.Ill. 2003)
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See, e.g., Hobley, 2003 WL 22682362, at p. 5 (N.D.Ill. 2003) (refusing to find waiver of privilege for
failure to file a privilege log, but granting sanctions in the form of attorney fees instead).
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See e.g. Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514, 520 (D.C.Del. 1980) (requiring production of all
document claimed to be privileged because “[a]n improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of
privilege at all”); Jones v. Boeing Co., 1995 WL 827992, at 1 (D.Kan.) (refusing to conduct an in camera
review of documents prior to compelling their production when claimant’s “blanket” claim of privilege and
failure to show that elements of privilege were met would result in shifting the burden of analysis and proof
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attorneys on the particular ethical concerns raised by claims of attorney-client privilege
should point out that claims of privilege can be unethical when made in the absence of
appropriate factual investigation, legal knowledge, research and analysis, and a full
privilege log.

C. SUBSTANTIVELY FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE
Having established that it is unethical to make a claim of attorney-client privilege
in a frivolous manner, it is now time to turn to those claims that are substantively frivolous
from an objective perspective. The vast majority of substantively frivolous claims of
privilege will be those made without appropriate factual investigation, legal knowledge,
research and analysis, and procedurally required disclosure. Thus, it might seem
unnecessary to address the issue of substantive frivolousness in an ethical rule. However,
there are several reasons why it is worth considering. First, the main, and we would hope
relatively rare exception to this overlap, would be the wicked lawyer who claims
information as privileged after engaging in factual investigation, legal knowledge, and
legal analysis which reveals that privilege is not available. The wicked as well as the
ignorant and lazy should be addressed by the ethical rules.
In addition, although substantively frivolous claims are most likely to be the result
of frivolous, indeed incompetent, pre-filing practices, it might be easier to decide as a
matter of law that a particular claim is substantively frivolous than to engage in a factintensive inquiry into the details of what the lawyer did and thought.230 Thus, targeting
substantively frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege could provide a simple way to
both motivate and regulate the pre-filing practices of attorneys making privilege claims.
Furthermore, the determination that there has been incompetent research and
analysis will not be able to avoid reference to the substantive frivolousness or merit of the
resulting claim.231 Particularly when there has been some research and analysis, the
competence of such research will in large part be judged by the product produced. Thus,
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But see Linda Ross Meyer, “When Reasonable Minds Differ,” 71 N.Y.U. L.R. 1467, 1485 (1996)
(arguing that judges in Rule 11 cases find it easier to decide that a lawyer has made a claim in a frivolous
manner than to decide that the claim is substantively frivolous).
231
Accord, id. at 1494-95 (“the practice-based approach does not eliminate the need for courts to
determine substantive issues”).
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it will sometimes be impossible to decide whether competent research and analysis
occurred without considering the merit of the resulting privilege claim.
An additional and particularly important reason for evaluating substantive
frivolousness in the context of attorney-client privilege here is that ethical obligations of
research and analysis only make sense to the extent the law of attorney-client privilege has
sufficient clarity and predictability to allow lawyers to distinguish meritorious claims of
privilege from frivolous claims. If the law of attorney-client privilege is “radically
indeterminate,”232 there will be very few substantively frivolous claims of privilege. This
would make post-hoc factual investigation, legal research, and legal analysis a much more
reasonable practice and undermine the conclusion reached above that failure to undertake
these prior to making the claim is unethical. Indeed, many otherwise competent and
ethical lawyers probably do rationalize their failures to investigate, research and analyze
possible claims of privilege on grounds that the law of privilege is sufficiently
indeterminate to ensure that some non-frivolous argument can be found. The truth of this
rationalization must be addressed both to justify the procedural ethical obligations outlined
above and to educate lawyers about the real dangers of making a frivolous claim of
privilege.
Whether the law of attorney-client privilege is radically indeterminate across the
board or only “modestly indeterminate”233 can as practical matter be studied by looking at
when and to what extent courts are willing to declare claims of privilege frivolous and
award sanctions.234 If the law of attorney-client privilege is only modestly indeterminate,
as will be asserted here,235 it should be possible to provide lawyers with some practical
guidance about what does and doesn’t make a claim of privilege frivolous. This guidance
can take two distinct forms. The first is general guidance about the kind of legal support
required to make a claim non-frivolous. The second kind of guidance addresses the
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Id. at 1468-70 (defining radical indeterminacy in the law as meaning that valid legal arguments can be
on either side of any legal issue).
233
Id. at 1470 (characterizing indeterminacy only in “small pockets” of the law as modestly indeterminate).
234
Id. at 1480 (stating that deciding whether a legal claim is frivolous is equivalent to deciding whether the
law relevant to that claim is indeterminate).
235
Accord, Report of the ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege at 4 (May 18, 2005) (noting that
“[a]t the margins, the application of privilege is not always clear, and indeed, treatises can and have been
written on the privilege, its exceptions, its intricacies, and its areas of ambiguity”).
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specific legal requirements of attorney-client privilege and attempts to identify specific
kinds of claims of privilege or problematic elements that produce frivolous claims.

1. General Characteristics of Substantively Frivolous Claims
As M.R. 3.1 “parallels and is best analyzed in tandem with Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,”236 we can look to both disciplinary cases under M.R. 3.1 and
sanction cases under Rule 11 for more specific guidance as to when a claim is frivolous.
We can also include FRCP 26(g)(2) cases imposing sanctions for frivolous discovery
positions, as language identical to that found in FRCP 11, “warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law”237 is
found there as well.238
MR 3.1 prohibits “assert[ing] or controvert[ing] an issue . . ., unless there is a
basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”239 Similar language
can be found in FRCP 11.240 The Comments to MR 3.1 add that an “action is frivolous,
however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the
action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law.”241 Good faith requires that there be “some
realistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated,”242 but the lawyer need not believe
that the position supported will ultimately prevail.243 The Arizona Supreme Court has
described the standard of objective frivolousness in both the ethical and legal context as
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ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, at 321.
F.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) (also adding the words “or the establishment of new law”); F.R.C.P. 26(g)(2).
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requiring that there be support by “any reasonable legal theory, or if a colorable legal
argument is presented about which reasonable attorneys could differ.”244
It is possible to distinguish two kinds of substantive frivolousness245: pure factual
frivolousness and legal/factual inadequacy. Pure factual frivolousness will only arise
when insufficient factual investigation coupled with a competent grasp of the law leads the
lawyer to assume facts sufficient under the law, when the facts are not actually
sufficient.246 This form of substantive frivolousness needs little further explication, but
will be specifically fleshed out in the context of attorney-client privilege below.
Legal/factual inadequacy arises when the lawyer is aware of facts inconsistent with the
law, yet insists the law applies, or when the lawyer is aware of law adverse to the facts, yet
insists a different legal result applies. The difference between these two descriptions of
frivolousness is more a matter of perspective than substance. The first looks more like
Cinderella’s sisters insisting that that their feet are small enough to fit in the glass slipper,
when they are clearly too large. We might describe this as obliviousness to inconsistent or
missing facts, while grasping that the law requires such facts.247 Legal/factual inadequacy
could be said to be present if Cinderella’s sisters had realistic ideas about the large size of
their feet, but either were convinced that the slipper was going to be large enough despite
never having seen it, or had somehow magnified the size of the slipper when they did see
it. This happens in a legal context when a lawyer has a realistic view of the facts, but
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Visoly v. Security Pacific Credit Corp., 768 So.2d 482, 491 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 2000) (“an appeal that
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F.R.D. 258, 263 (S.D. N.Y. 1995) where the court found no substantial justification for privilege claims
both when the claimant conceded in response to the motion to compel that many documents had been
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misunderstands the law and its application,248 is ignorant of the law,249 or refuses to accept
that the law relied upon requires different or additional facts.250 This also includes
situations when lawyers do not even try to address arguments and cases cited by the other
side,251 when they fail to distinguish controlling adverse authority,252when they assert
irrelevant distinctions,253 or when they take the general position that no argument is
frivolous if the United States Supreme Court has not yet rejected it on the merits.254
At the same time, the prohibition on frivolous litigation is not meant to “chill the
248

See e.g., In Re Capoccia, 709 N.Y.2d 640, 643 (N.Y.A.D. 3. Dept. 2000 (“`[Respondent] attempt[s] to
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249
See e.g.,Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Zradkovich, 762 A.2d 950, 965 (Md. 2000)
(ethically frivolous removal to federal court when plaintiff attempted to remove from Texas State Court to
Federal Court in Maryland, but statute allowed only defendant to remove and then only to Federal Court in
Texas and court speculated that lawyer had not bothered to read statute); Investerings Partnership v. U.S.,
1998 WL 647214, at 1 (D.D.C. 1998) (party position not substantially justified under FRCP 37(a)(4) when
failed to discover controlling precedent); Vinton v. Adam Aircraft Industries, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 650, 663
(D.Colo. 2005) (finding no abuse of discretion in a magistrate’s imposition of sanctions for claim of
privilege found not to be substantially justified because supported by only a single conclusory sentence
claiming privilege).
250
See e.g., In Re Brough, 709 So.2d 210, 210 (La. 1998) (filing suit against the insured of an insolvent
insurance carrier and its legal successor was ethically frivolous when statute barred suits unless uninsured
motorist policy limits were exhausted);. See In Re Richards, 986 P.2d 1117, 1119, (N.M. 1999) (factually
very similar cases finding the exception inapplicable make reliance on exception ethically frivolous);
Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 161 F.R.D. 258, 266 (S.D. N.Y. 1995) (finding no
substantial justification under FRCP 37(a)(4) for withholding documents as attorney-client privileged when
factual predicate for limited waiver not established).
251
See e.g., Atheridge v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 184 F.R.D. 200, 207 (D.D.C. 1998) (“running
from the fight by ignoring what one’s opponent has said is not a substantially justified position for a litigant
to take”); Bowne, 161 F.R.D. at 265 (no substantial justification when memorandum “fail[ed] to
acknowledge the existence of” [controlling authority] prominently discussed by moving party).
252
See Bowne, 161 F.R.D. at 266 (finding no substantial justification under FRCP 37(a)(4) for withholding
documents as attorney-client privileged when sanctioned party used “ `[t]he ostrich-like tactic of pretending
that potentially dispositive authority against a litigant's contention does not exist’ ”); Athridge v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co., 184 F.R.D. 200, 206 (D.D.C. 1998) (awarding expenses for the motion to compel
because “running from the fight by ignoring what one's opponent has said is not a substantially justified
position for a litigant to take”); Prousi v.Cruisers Division of KCS International, Inc., et al., 1997 WL
135692, at 1 (E.D.Pa.) (ordering payment of the other side’s fees and expenses for a motion to compel
disclosure of the date of a fee agreement when the lack of privilege was easily researched and clearly
addressed by Third Circuit precedent).
253
In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 915 (1997) (lawyer “disregarded well-established Kansas law” and
“presented a distinction without a difference” “to distinguish the court’s previous decision on this issue”).
253
Flaherty v.Gas Research Institute, 31 F.3d 451, 459 (7th Cir. 1994) (frivolous under Rule 11 to argue
case holding that courts had no jurisdiction to hear age discrimination claims until a final administrative
order did not apply to a retaliation for opposing age discrimination claim when both claims encompassed
by same statute).
254
See People v. Hartman, 744 P.2d 482, 483-5 (Co. 1987) (frivolous to argue that U.S. Supreme Court
might accept argument that wages are not income when U.S. Tax court has rejected this argument for many
decades and recently stated that raising such an argument would be viewed as frivolous); In re Solerwitz,
848 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (C.A.Fed. 1988) (rejecting the expert testimony of law professor that it is not
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creativity that is the very lifeblood of the law [when v]ital changes have been wrought by
those members of the bar who have dared to challenge the received wisdom.”255 If “there
is no controlling precedent on the issue, and counsel marshals what authority there is in
support of her position, the position she articulates will be found to be substantially
justified even if it does not prevail.”256 However, when potentially dispositive adverse
authority exists, it must both be acknowledged257 and “cogent argument . . . made.”258
Thus it is not sufficient to acknowledge the lack of legal support but assert simpliciter that
the law should be different259 to avoid being viewed as frivolous. Support and/or
arguments for a demand for change must first be sought through legal research, and
support must be found, even if only “in minority opinions, in law review articles, or
through consultation with other attorneys.”260 In cases where other jurisdictions have
developed law more supportive than the controlling adverse authority, failure to point to

frivolous to remake same arguments to appellate court despite that court’s precedent rejecting such
arguments as long as the Supreme Court has not decided these issues on the merits).
255
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this inconsistency will make the claim frivolous.261
A new comment to the Model Rules designed to focus the attention of attorneys
on the particular ethical concerns raised by claims of attorney-client privilege could
usefully point out that claims of privilege are frivolous if they are missing essential facts,
are based on ignorance or misreading of the law of privilege, fail to acknowledge and
appropriately distinguish controlling adverse authority, or are based on a change or
reversal of existing law without providing argument and support for such a change.

2. Specific Claims of Privilege that are Substantively Frivolous
We now turn to considering the extent to which the law of attorney-client
privilege may be described as determinate, thereby allowing for claims of privilege to be
considered frivolous. The analysis of this issue will be limited to a review of some of the
specific factual situations in which claims of attorney-client privilege have regularly been
deemed either frivolous or non-frivolous by the courts. Such findings arise in a variety of
contexts, including motions for sanction under FRCP 37(a)(4) (discovery abuse) and 28
U.S.C. §1927 (liability for excessive costs due to unreasonable and vexatious
multiplication of proceeding) as well as contempt hearings under FRCP 45(e) (failure to
obey a subpoena) and the inherent power of the courts.262
The discussion of these cases will be generally organized according to the basic
elements of privilege at stake. Although many courts cite to the highly articulated Judge
Wyzanski definition of attorney-client privilege263 from United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp.,264 the somewhat simpler Wigmore definition will mostly suffice here:
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See Bowne, 161 F.R.D. at 266 (noting that had the party argued when first challenged that “the law was
unsettled,” substantial justification for withholding documents would have been found).
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See e.g., NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696, 702 (5th Cir. 1990)
(“federal courts have inherent power to police themselves by civil contempt, imposition of fines, the
awarding of costs and the shifting of fees”), aff’d sub nom. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
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Epstein, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 46 (describing the Wyzanski formulation as “much
quoted").
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89 F.Supp. 357, 358-9 (D. Mass. 1950) (“The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the
privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a
member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as
a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b)
without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a
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(1)Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose
(4) made in confidence
(5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived.265
a. Frivolous Because No Legal Advice
The requirement that legal advice be sought will undermine privilege claims when
no advice whatsoever is sought from an attorney or when the type of advice sought is
business, scientific, literary, public relations, or any other non-legal advice. In general,
deciding whether legal advice is being sought is first a highly fact-dependent evaluation.
In addition, there are particular factual settings about which courts do not always agree
whether the nature of the service is legal or predominantly legal.266 Thus, whether a
claim that legal advice is involved can be viewed as frivolous may well depend on the
particular factual setting and the settled or unsettled nature of the legal analysis governing
this setting in this jurisdiction.267 Nonetheless, courts have been willing to describe some
attempts to cloak communications to lawyers that do not seek legal advice or that involve
non-legal concerns as frivolous and deserving of sanctions.
In F.D.I.C. v. Hurwitz,268 sanctions were awarded for, among other egregious
misconduct by the FDIC, claiming privilege for purely investigative work by attorneys.269
In Cobell v. Norton,270 sanctions were granted for attorney-client privilege objections to
questions that would have revealed at most the content of lawyer-client conversations
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8 J. Wigmore, EVIDENCE §2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
E.g., preparation of tax returns by an attorney. See Rice, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, §7:9, text
at 65 & n. 94 (describing three different positions taken by the 8th Circuit, the 2nd Circuit, and N.D. Ill.).
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Industries, Inc. v. Meridith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977)).
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See generally, Rice, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE §7:10-26, at 69-110 (summarizing legal advice
case law in a variety of factual settings).
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384 F.Supp.2d 1039 (S.D.Tex. 2005) (awarding over $72 million in attorneys fees and costs arising out
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Id. at 1097 (no privilege when lawyers are acting as executives, investigators or regulators).
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213 F.R.D. 16 (D.D.C. 2003) (granting motion to compel and sanctions where privilege claimed for
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about the client’s schedule and availability for a deposition.271 As the client’s
communications about her schedule were not provided for the purpose of seeking advice
at all, they failed to meet this basic element of privilege.272 Sanctions were justified in
this case because, despite a nineteen-page memorandum citing four “supportive” cases,
the position taken by the Justice Department was deemed not supported by case law and
legally frivolous.273 The court imposed the more extreme sanction of requiring the
attorneys to personally pay the costs of the motion to compel because this attempt to
“obstruct[ ] a legitimate inquiry into whether her co-counsel had lied to the Court . .
.[was] made more repugnant by the fact that defense counsel is not only an officer of the
court, but a representative of the Department of Justice.”274
Advice was sought from an attorney in Amway Corp. v. The Procter & Gamble
Corp,275 however, since it concerned the negative public relations consequences of suing
nuns, priests and ministers who had repeated allegations of a Satanism/Procter & Gamble
connection, it was not legal advice.276 This conclusion was further bolstered by the fact
that copies of the documents seeking this advice were simultaneously circulated to
numerous non-legal personnel.277 The opinion states that, as a general rule,
[w]here . . . in-house counsel appears as one of many recipients of
an otherwise business-related memo, the federal courts place a
heavy burden on the proponent to make a clear showing that
counsel is acting in a professional legal capacity and that the
document reflects legal, as opposed to business, advice.278
As a result of these and other frivolous claims of privilege, as well as Procter & Gamble’s
failure to provide adequate affidavit support for its claims of privilege, the magistrate
judge recommended a sanction in the form of an order establishing a fact suggested by
the non-privileged, but improperly withheld documents.
Similarly, in American Medical Systems, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance
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Co. of Pittsburgh, PA,279 attorneys fees were awarded as a sanction for frivolous claims
of attorney-client privilege280 for transmittal letters 281 and documents sent to both legal
and non-legal personnel. 282 Transmittal letters are not viewed as involving legal advice
because they “merely transmit documents to or from an attorney.”283 When documents
sent to both legal and non-legal personnel, they are not viewed as “made primarily for the
purpose of seeking legal advice.”284
As these cases illustrate, lawyers who assume that the “legal advice” element of
attorney-client privilege is met simply because a lawyer has sent or received a
communication run the risk of making a frivolous claim. This element of privilege is
particularly problematic when the attorney receiving the communication is in-house
counsel because these positions involve non-legal as well as legal duties. Indeed, courts
place the burden on the in-house counsel claimant of privilege to show that legal rather
than non-legal advice was sought.285 The difficulty of proving attorney-client privilege
becomes even greater if the lawyer is merely one of many recipients of a copy of a
document.286
Another problematic context for privilege arises when lawyers are present at
corporate meetings engaged in non-legal corporate business, often as a voting member of
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Id. at 2.
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the committee.287 A careful factual evaluation of the context in which the
communication was made must take seriously the possibility that non-legal advice may
have been sought and recognize the extra burden created by multiple non-lawyer
recipients of the communication.
Given the highly fact-dependent nature of such legal advice analyses, especially
in the corporate context,288 it is unlikely that the assertion of privilege in such situations
will be viewed as substantively frivolous as long as affirmative factual support is
provided and an argument is made regarding the legal nature of the advice. Thus, in
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds, 289 while nearly all communications concerning scientific
evidence on the health effects of smoking cigarettes were found to involve public
relations or general business advice,290 the court refused to sanction the claims of
attorney-client privilege.291 In part, this refusal was due to a few successful privilege
claims. However, the court also seemed to view the novel factual context of this case, in
which tobacco corporation attorneys had extensive control over scientific and public
relations matters at the same time litigation over the health risks of tobacco was on-going,
as making the application of the legal principles more complicated.292 Nonetheless, the
court did describe as “avoidable”293 some of the effort both the plaintiff and court were
forced to expend to resolve the privilege questions and further described tobacco counsel
as not using the best professional practice294 when they failed to acknowledge and argue
the adverse law of the case on these privilege issues.295
More recently, the Seventh Circuit has described claims of privilege involving
287

Marten v. Yellow Freight Systems, 1998 WL 13244, at 8-9 (D. Kan. 1998) (finding that a committee
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“distinguishing in-house counsels' legal advice from their business advice” 296 as “an area
of privilege law that is generally recognized to be ‘especially difficult.’ ”297 As a result,
the court found that such claim of privilege were made in good faith where an appropriate
privilege log had been filed, and counsel exhibited good faith by reducing the number of
documents on the log from 750 to 465 in response to objections.298 However, making
“blanket” privilege claims,299 or failing to provide a privilege log or other support300 in
these contexts is particularly likely to trigger sanctions. Thus, in an earlier tobacco case
in Minnesota,301 sanctions were awarded for claims of privilege302 involving the same or
similar documents,303 despite the fact that a majority of all the withheld documents were
found privileged.304 Although this case additionally involved application of the crimefraud exception to defeat the privilege, many documents were found not to be privileged
“in the first instance”305 because they “contained nothing of a privileged nature.”306 It
can be surmised from the general description of documents at issue here,307 that many of
the documents were not privileged because they involved non-legal advice. Sanctions
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were awarded308 because these frivolous claims of privilege revealed “a pattern of
abuse”309 arising from either an attempt to deceive the court or a failure to engage in the
required level of legal and factual analysis of each document claimed to be privileged.310

b. Frivolous Because No Lawyer Qua Lawyer
The next element of attorney-client privilege requires that the legal advice be
sought from a lawyer in their capacity as a lawyer. A claim of privilege for a
communication to a person who is clearly not an attorney or an agent to an attorney will
be viewed as frivolous. Thus, in Amway Corp. v. The Procter & Gamble Corp,311 the
court described as frivolous a claim of privilege for a document in which neither the
author nor any of the recipients was an attorney.312 In Chinnici v. Central Dupage
Hospital Assoc.,313 the court described counsel as having “ignored the law of
privilege”314 requiring both an attorney and a client when the lawyer redacted a section of
a memo from a non-lawyer condominium association president to other association
members.315 In Heath v. F/V ZOLOTOI,316 sanctions in the form of a $25,000 personal
fine against the lawyers and a finding of liability against the client were imposed when
the lawyers failed to reveal the existence of routine witness statements made without any
attorney involvement and then subsequently made frivolous arguments that they were
privileged.317
Claims of privileges involving communications to both a lawyer and non-lawyer
are less likely to be viewed as frivolous when the possibility exists that the non-lawyer
the communication was made to was an agent of the attorney. The so-called agent must
308
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be needed by the attorney in order to render legal advice318 and must in fact be under the
direction and supervision of the attorney at the time of the communications.319 These are
primarily factual matters, and will require lawyers to engage in the necessary level of
factual investigation to ensure that the appropriate foundation facts are present and
asserted in a privilege log or support affidavits.
However, the issue of whether particular kinds of assistance are really required to
obtain legal advice can become a matter of law. One issue that frequently arises in this
context is whether communications with an accountant employed by the client’s lawyer
are privileged when they were made for the purpose of having the accountant prepare the
client’s tax return. As most courts do not view the preparation of a tax return by an
attorney as involving legal advice, the same work performed by the accountant is viewed
as lacking a relationship to legal advice.320 The status of psychiatric experts hired by the
defense in criminal cases is also an issue that will be resolved as a matter of controlling
law, which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.321 Another vexing issue concerns
whether communications to patent agents are privileged either as communications to
attorneys322 or as communications to agents of attorneys.323
While the lack of national consensus in these matters might suggest the law is
indeterminate on this issue, there is settled law within jurisdictions. Lawyers wishing to
avoid substantively frivolous claims of privilege for communications to agents of
attorneys must do the legal research required to determine whether their jurisdiction has
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addressed the privilege issue with regard to the kind of agent at issue in their case and, if
they want to challenge settled law, must both acknowledge negative controlling
precedents and make a colorable argument as to why a different approach should be
adopted.
c. Frivolous Because Not Communications Relating to the Purpose
of Seeking Legal Advice
There are two distinctly different types of privilege claims that are substantively
frivolous due to failure to meet this element. The first involves exchanges that are not
viewed as communications at all, such as objects, observations, underlying information
and pre-existing documents. The second group concerns specified kinds of information
that are not viewed to be for the purpose of seeking legal advice as a matter of law even
though communicated to lawyers from whom legal advice has otherwise been sought.
i. Non-Communications
As we have already seen in the discussion of In Re Ryder above,324 physical
objects that do not contain a message to the attorney inscribed upon them are not
communications.325 The consequences to lawyers who risk their licenses and freedom on
frivolous claims of privilege for such items can be dire.326 A claim of privilege regarding
an object is most likely to be deemed frivolous when the object is evidence of a crime
and is made to defend a lawyer’s possession and failure to turn over the object to police,
as was the case in In Re Ryder.327 Attorneys who take and keep possession of such
objects believing that they are acting within the law are in fact courting criminal
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prosecution.328
A more complicated legal issue arises when an attorney is served with a subpoena
duces tecum requiring them to produce an object, often identified as relating to or
received from a specified client. While the object itself cannot be claimed to be
privileged, the production of the object by the attorney in response to the detailed
subpoena request might or might not be viewed as implicitly disclosing an intentional
communication to the lawyer, i.e., the fact that the client had possession of the object
prior to transferring it to the lawyer.329 If production is viewed as testimonial, one
solution is to require the attorney to simply produce the item to the district attorney,
thereby avoiding the more testimonial production to the grand jury.330 If not, the lawyer
may suffer contempt sanctions.331 The best way to avoid this risk is to understand both
that the object is not privileged and cannot be kept for any length of time by the
lawyer.332
These complications, while worth being aware of because they threaten lawyers
who fail to understand them with criminal prosecution or contempt, are not particularly
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relevant to the issue of frivolous claims of privilege in the civil litigation context. To
begin with, an entirely different standard of frivolousness is applied to criminal
defense.333 More importantly, information about a client’s original possession of an
object is less likely to have the kind of evidentiary value it often has when the object is a
gun or stolen money in a criminal case. This means that possession information is less
likely to be viewed as an intentional communication arising out of the transfer. Finally,
such information can be easily discovered from clients, due to the lack of a fifth
amendment privilege against incrimination leading merely to civil liability and the
availability of liberal civil discovery, thus usually making it quite unnecessary to seek
this kind of information from attorneys.
Two other kinds of non-communications are attorney observations of clients and
the underlying information conveyed in the communication. Attorney observations of
client appearance, coherence, etc., are not viewed as communications334 unless the
observation was made as the result of a communicative act by the client.335 Similarly,
while the fact that certain information or facts were communicated to an attorney is
protected from disclosure by the attorney or client, the underlying information minus the
fact of communication to the attorney, can be compelled from the client.336
Finally, documents created independent of the attorney-client relationship for
purposes other than communicating information to the attorney are not themselves
communications from the client to the attorney and are not attorney-client privileged.337
Even though such “pre-existing documents” can subsequently be used by clients to
communicate the information contained therein to lawyers, it is the showing of the
333
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document to the lawyer that is the communication rather than the document itself.338
Especially in business contexts, careful attention to the facts surrounding the creation of a
document is essential to determine whether the client can meet the burden of proof by
showing that it was it was initially created for the purpose of later transmitting to the
lawyer rather than for another business purpose.339
There is one exception to this rule; pre-existing documents protected by the Fifth
Amendment while in the possession of the client but unprotected by the Fifth amendment
in the possession of the client’s lawyer are considered privileged.340 However, this is
precisely the kind of narrow exception that requires careful attention to both the facts of
the case and the legal doctrine in order for a good faith argument to be made regarding the
privileged status of pre-existing documents. 341

ii. Communications not for the Purpose of Legal Advice
The fact that there is an attorney-client relationship formed for the purpose of
seeking legal advice does not mean that all communications made in the context of this
relationship are privileged. Each individual communication must be shown to be for the
purpose of seeking legal advice. There are three kinds of information routinely
communicated to attorneys by clients that are frequently not viewed as communicated for
the purpose of seeking legal advice: identity of client, location of client, and fee or billing
information.
w. Identity of Client
The identity of the client, while certainly communicated by the client to the
attorney in the course of seeking legal advice, is in most cases not viewed as protected by
attorney-client privilege.342 This result has been justified on many different grounds: no
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339

69

legal advice is sought concerning the client’s identity;343 the identity of the client is
usually not intended to remain confidential and is often intended to be revealed in the
course of providing representation of the client in dealings with non-clients,344 or the
lawyer was hired by the client for the purpose of furthering criminal activity.345
Yet these analysis of these situations is complicated by the fact that client identity
will be viewed as privileged if “disclosure would reveal a privileged confidential
attorney-client communication, or where disclosure would incriminate the client, but
perhaps only if it provides the last link in a chain of evidence against him, and perhaps
only if it does so in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought.”346 In
addition, there is considerable variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as to the validity
or applicability of this ‘last link’ or ‘legal advice’ exception.347 Finally, the actual
application of the exception is highly fact-dependent and cogent arguments can often be
made on both sides.348 As a result, it is difficult to provide much general guidance as to
when a claim of privilege for client identity might be viewed as frivolous.
However, as the exception continues to be the subject of considerable litigation,349
it seems likely that the application of the exception within any single jurisdiction will
become regularized. This then creates the possibility of determining that a particular

343

See, e.g. People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County, 270 N.Y.S. 362, 367-68 (S. Ct. 1934) (“ ‘The
client does not consult the solicitor with a view to obtaining his professional advice as to whether he shall
be his solicitor or not.’ ”) (quoting Bursill v. Tanner, L. R. 16 Q. B. D. 1, 4.)).
344
See e.g., U.S. v. Flores, 628 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1980) (attorney hired to file administrative claim by
named client to recover guns seized in search cannot claim privilege for name of source of information for
claim)
345
Grand Jury Proceedings in the Matter of Pavlick, 680 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1982) (refusing to
find the identity of a client privileged when client paid fees for persons involved in drug smuggling who
had been induced to smuggle in part by a promise that they would be “taken care of” if arrested).
346
Rothstein & Crump, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES, §2:11, at 90-94 (footnotes removed)
(collecting a large number of cases showing the different ways this exception has been formulated, and the
considerable differences in results reached from case to case and circuit to circuit). See also Tillotson v.
Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965) (reversing contempt for an attorney refusing to disclose the
identity of a client who had independently determined that he had a tax liability and retained the attorney in
question to deliver a cashier’s check for the amount to the IRS).
347
See Rice, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE §6:15, text at notes 24 –26 (describing the 10th circuit as
questioning this exception and the 2nd Cir as first reformulating the exception and then consistently refusing
to find it applicable).
348
See e.g., Pavlick, 680 F.2d at 1026 (district court and court of appeals found identity of fee-payer
privileged, reversed en banc with three out of seven judges dissenting).
349
See Rothstein & Crump, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES, §2:11, 87-99 (summarizing cases
on client identity).
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claim to come within the exception fails to make even a colorable case.350 The legal
consequence of making such a frivolous claim is likely to be contempt for the attorney
raising this objection, as attempts to get testimony from attorneys about undisclosed
clients are most often made in the context of grand jury investigations351 and criminal
trials of third parties.352

x. Location or Address of Client
In ordinary cases, clients’ communication of their address is clearly neither made
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice nor meant to be confidential.353 However, in
cases where clients do not want to be found, address information communicated to an
attorney is meant to be confidential. In these cases, the factual context of the
communication becomes paramount in determining whether privilege will attach to the
location information. Attempts to compel lawyers to disclose the confidentially
communicated location or address of clients most often arise in the context of custody
cases in which one parent has disappeared with minor children,354 criminal cases in which
the defendant cannot be found or has skipped bail,355 and civil cases in which the location
of a client is needed to enforce a monetary judgment.356

350

Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding attorney’s fee sanction arising from
privilege claim for client identity was not abuse of discretion because legal issue was not sufficiently
doubtful to show good faith dispute).
351
E.g., Ex Parte Enzor, 117 So. 2d 361, 362 & 365-66 (Ala. 1960) (reversing an order of confinement for
an attorney who refused to disclose a client’s identity to a grand jury because disclosure would reveal the
client’s guilt on the very matter for which the lawyer had been employed to advise).
352
E.g. Flores, 628 F.3d at 527 (affirming order of confinement for civil contempt until attorney testified,
matter expired, or 18 months had been served); Hughes v. Meade, 453 S.W. 2d 538, (Ky. Ct. Ap. 1970)
(civil contempt order for refusing to reveal name of client justified because attorney hired to help return
stolen property to police was not providing legal advice at all).
353
Accord, Rothstein & Crump, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 84 –87 (describing client
address information as non-privileged because related to general features of attorney-client relationship
rather than communications for specific advice); Viveros v. Nationwide Janitorial Ass'n, Inc., 200 F.R.D.
681, 684 (N.D.Ga.2000) (imposing sanctions of $50 and attorney fees where addresses and phone numbers
were withheld on ground of privilege and there was no attempt to show confidential legal advice was
sought regarding the address).
354
See e.g., Bersani v. Bersani, 565 A.2d 1368 (Ct. Super. Ct. 1989) (wife disappeared with children);
Dike v. Dike, 448 P.2d 490 (Wash. 1968) (wife disappeared with child).
355
See e.g., Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1986) (attorney refused to reveal location of
client who skipped bail in a rape case).
356
See Sullivan v. Carrigan, 10 F.R.D. Serv. 431 (E.D Pa. 1988) (attorney in contempt for refusing to
reveal the telephone number of client with an outstanding default judgment).
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In the custody cases, the location of the client who has disappeared with minor
children has often been found to fall outside of attorney-client privilege, with some
important exceptions. When the failure to disclose location assists the client in
contemptuous violation of a court order not to leave the jurisdiction and frustrates court
rulings bases on the best interests of the child, any legal purpose for the communication is
trumped by the use of the attorney to assist in the criminal/fraudulent conduct of the
conduct, thus bringing the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege into
effect.357 At the same time, however, courts have upheld claims that client location
information was privileged where harm to the parent or child was feared if the location
was revealed,358 or when it was not clear that the disappearing parent had actually
violated a valid court order.359
Several decades ago, when this was a novel issue of law, judgments of contempt
against lawyers refusing to disclose such information were vacated even as courts clearly
held that the information had to be disclosed.360 In jurisdictions where these issues have
been settled for some time, courts may now be willing to find lawyers in contempt for
refusing to disclose the location of disappearing parents in custody cases involving clear
violation of court orders and not involving fear of harm because such claims will be
viewed as substantively frivolous.

y. Fee or Billing Information
Attorney-client privilege protects only communications made for the purpose of
getting legal advice; it does not protect “all occurrences and conversations which have

357

See Bersani, 565 A.2d at 1371-2 (wife in contempt of order not to leave country); Jacqueline F. v. Segal,
391 N.E. 2d 967, 972 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1979) (guardian moved to Puerto Rico during appeal of custody
order); JaFarain-Kerman v. JaFarain-Kerman, 424 S.W.2d 333, 340(Mo. App. 1967)(finding no privilege
when husband left country with child in violation of temporary custody order because this obstruction of
justice triggered the crime-fraud exception).
358
See e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 359 N.E. 2d 820, 821 (Ill. App. 1977) (wife requested confidentiality of
address due to her fear for her safety and that of her child); Waldman v. Waldman, 358 N.E.2d 521, 522
(Ohio 1976) (suggesting that confidentiality of client addresses may be generally necessary in domestic
relations matters to protect client safety).
359
See e.g., Brennan v. Brennan, 422 A.2d 510, 517 (Pa.Super. Ct. 1980) (finding no crime or fraud
because father had not been served with notice of custody hearing or custody order).
360
See e.g., Dike, 448 P.2d at 499 (relieving the attorney of the contempt citation because the “application
of the privilege [wa]s rather obscure”).
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any bearing, direct or indirect, upon the relationship of the attorney with his client.”361
Such occurrences and conversations either do not involve communications from clients,
or if they do, are not viewed as confidential communications for the purpose of seeking
legal advice.362 Thus, information ordinarily found in bills, such as time expended,363 the
fact of meetings or calls,364 the general nature of work done,365 fee arrangements,366
including the fact of payment and who paid367, and expenses,368 is not viewed as
privileged. However, if revealing this information has the effect of revealing a
privileged attorney-client communication, such fee or billing information will be viewed
as privileged as well.369 Thus, where the client’s motive for seeking legal services, the
litigation strategy or the specifics of the legal services sought could be deduced from
particularly detailed bills, they have been treated as privileged.370 Some courts have
viewed billing information as privileged where the information would incriminate the
client,371 but, more recently, this has been limited to cases where disclosure of an actual
confidential communication would result.372

361

United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281-82 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976, 84 S.Ct. 1883,
12 L.Ed.2d 746 (1964).
362
In Re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1980).
363
Id.
364
Id.
365
Rothstein & Crump, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 85 (2003).
366
Osterhoudt v. U.S., 722 F.2d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1983) (“generally ‘fee arrangements with . . . clients are
not confidential communications protected by attorney-client privilege’”).
367
In Re Walsh, 623 F.2d at 494.
368
Rothstein & Crump, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 89.
369
Id. at 92.
370
See Clarke v. American Commerce Nat. Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting exception, but
finding no privilege in this case where “statements contain information on the identity of the client, the case
name for which payment was made, the amount of the fee, and the general nature of the services
performed”).
371
Rothstein & Crump, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES at 92-94 (although this has been limited
by some courts to situations where the information “provides the last link in a chain of evidence” against
the client).
372
Id. at 97-99. See e.g., Seventh Elect Church in Israel v. Rogers, 688 P.2d 506, 533 (Wa. 1984) (holding
that a potentially incriminating disclosure re fees was not privileged if it did not “convey the substance of
confidential communications”); Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d at 592-4 (noting that the idea that mere incrimination
would make the fee information privileged, rather than the privileged nature of the information revealed,
was based on a misreading of case law); In Re Grand Jury Proceedings v. U.S., 896 F.2d at 1274-5
(explaining that the implicit communication of the fact of having sufficient money to pay the fee which
accompanies payment or a promise to pay a fee is not confidential and need not be protected to encourage
effective legal representation).
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These special circumstances are not likely to be present in cases not involving
either unusually detailed bills,373 criminal wrongdoing,374 or the payment of a fee by the
client or a third party in a circumstance suggestive of wrongdoing by the client.375
Furthermore, the presence of these special circumstances only suggests the possibility
that a confidential communication may be revealed with fee information, it does not
guarantee it.376 Careful attention to the presence of special circumstances, legal research
and an analysis of the basic elements of privilege sufficient to provide a good faith
argument that fee or billing records fall within these possible exceptions will be
necessary to prevent claims of attorney-client privilege for such information from being
found sanctionable.377

d. Frivolous Because Not Made in Confidence
A communication from client to attorney must be both intended to be confidential
and made in a manner that reasonably could achieve confidentiality in order to satisfy the
confidentiality element .378 Information is not intended to be confidential if it is intended

373

See e.g., Real v. Continental Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 211, 214 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (noting the unusually
detailed nature of the billing statements sought to be discovered); Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394,
403 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding privilege where the bills showed the federal statutes researched); Lane v. Sharp
Packaging Systems, Inc., 640 N.W.2d 788, 804-5 (Wis. 2002) (finding billing records that contained
detailed descriptions of the legal service privileged).
374
See generally, id. at 90-97, notes 22-24 ( collecting and discussing the mostly criminal cases in which
claims of privilege were upheld for information of this kind); In Re Grand Jury Subpoena (Zerendow), 925
F.Supp. 849, 857 (D.Ma 1995) (noting that the payment information, determined to be non-privileged, was
sought regarding the the wrongdoing of others rather than the client).
375
See generally, id. at 92-97 & note 24 (discussing numerous cases and circumstances in which client
incrimination did or did not make fee information privileged).
376
In Re Grand Jury Subpoena (Zerendow), 925 F.Supp. at 855 (noting that fee information is privileged
only in “rare situations”).
377
See e.g., R.A. Hanson Co., Inc. v. Magnuson, 903 P.2d 496, 502 & 505 (Wash.App. Div. 3 1995)
(affirming a contempt order against an attorney who refused on grounds of privilege to disclose information
about the attorney’s payment on behalf of the client of legal fees for a third party in another case); Moudy
v. Superior Court, 964 P.2d 469, 472 (Alaska App.1998) (affirming a finding of contempt for an attorney
who refused on grounds of attorney-client privilege to reveal whether a client had been told of a trial date
and whether the client had had contact with other Public Defender staff); State v. Keenan, 771 P.2d 244,
248 (Or. 1989) (upholding a contempt finding for refusal to disclose dates of attorney-client contacts
where the substance of the communications would not thereby be revealed).But see Seventh Elect Church,
688 P.2d at 536 ( vacating a finding of contempt against lawyers who refused “in good faith” to disclose
unprivileged legal fee information in a case that appeared to make new law in Washington as no
Washington precedents were cited in the court’s attorney-client privilege analysis).
378
Rice, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 6:1, 7-9 (confidentiality requires both subjective and
objective intent).
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to be transmitted by the attorney to a third party. 379 Thus information provided to an
attorney for the purpose of preparing a tax return, for incorporation in a letter to a third
party, a prospectus, or a filing, or for any other form of disclosure will not be viewed as a
confidential communication.380 Communications made in public places with no attempt
to avoid being overheard381 or deliberately made in the presence of third parties who
cannot be shown to be a client spouse,382 the agent of the client or the attorney,383 or
otherwise necessary to provision of legal services 384will not be viewed made in
confidence. Of course, determinations of what the client intended re transmittal to others,
who is an agent of a client or attorney, who is necessary to provision of legal services, or
what constitutes reasonable attempts to ensure or maintain confidentiality of
communications will be highly fact-dependent. As long as sufficient facts are present to
allow a good faith argument on these points, a claim of privilege will not be frivolous or
unethical.
Although clients with a common interest, such as joint clients, who communicate
with their attorney in each other’s presence technically do so in the presence of a third
party, such communications are nonetheless viewed as made in confidence as to real third
parties.385 The presence of a common interest is crucial to the finding of privilege in
these cases, and can arise in a number of factual situations, including patent cases, joint
ventures, and common criminal or civil defense.386 A claim of privilege under the
common interest doctrine will not be frivolous as long a good faith basis in fact and law
exists for claiming a common interest. However, such communications are not viewed as

379

Epstein, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 178.
Id. at 172-76 & 178-82 (summarizing cases where no intention of confidentiality was found due to
expectation of transmittal to third parties). But see Rice, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE §6:8, 54
(suggesting that the conclusion of no intent for confidentiality should not be inferred from intent to have the
lawyer transmit the information subsequently, as legal services may counsel against the transmission).
381
Rothstein & Crump, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES §2:16, 107-8 (reasonable attempts to
avoid ordinary eavesdropping or observation must be made).
382
Epstein, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 168 (noting that the presence of other relatives or
non-marital partners will destroy confidentiality). But see Schreiber v. Kellogg, 1992 WL 309632 at 1
(E.D. Pa. 1992) (presence of father of client at meeting with client and his attorney does not defeat
attorney-client privilege).
383
Rothstein & Crump, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES at §2:16, 111.
384
Id. at 115-16. See also Tausz c. Clarion-Goldfield Community School District, 596 N.W.2d 125, (Ia.
1997) (holding that the presence of a accountant was essential to rendering a legal opinion).
385
Epstein, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 196.
386
Id. at 196-213. See also Rothstein & Crump, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES §2:17, 117-21.
380
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made in confidence vis a vis the joint clients themselves.387 As a result, attorney-client
privilege cannot be asserted by one joint client to prevent disclosure of communications
to the joint attorney.388
e. Frivolous Because Not Made By the Client
Attorney-client privilege will only attach to communications made by the client or
an agent of the client.389 It is the claimant’s burden to show that there is an attorneyclient relationship. 390 Various legal tests are used to assess whether an agent
communication is involved, depending on whether the client is an individual or an entity
with many internal corporate agents,391 and whether the agent is an independent
contractor, assistant or consultant.392 These tests are highly-fact dependent, thus it may
be that many claims of agency are at least colorable and therefore non-frivolous.
However, the absence of facts making the agency relationship colorable will make a
claim of privilege arising from a third party communication frivolous and unethical.393

f. Frivolous Because Privilege Has Been Waived
The party claiming privilege also bears the burden of showing that the privilege
has not been waived.394 Thus, a claim of privilege may be substantively frivolous if
made for communications that would be privileged but for a clearly present subsequent
waiver. However, while some waivers involve fairly simple legal rules and factual
387

Epstein, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 213.
See Athridge, 184 F.R.D. at 204 (finding communication from insurance company to insured’s lawyer
not privileged against insured where lawyer is viewed as representing common interest of insured and
insurance company).
389
Rice, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE at §4:1, 9-10.
390
Rice, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE at §4:1, 8-9 (noting that prospective clients are clients for this
purpose and that the burden is on the claimant to show the relationship).
391
E.g., Upjohn v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 384 (1981) (setting out the federal test of privilege for
communications from corporate employees to corporate attorneys).
392
Rice, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE at §4:2, 12-21 (discussing the “necessity” test used to
determine the agent status of non-employees).
393
Waldman, 358 N.E.2d at 523 (contempt upheld for attorney claiming privilege for address of son of
client because attorney failed for provide any evidence showing that he learned this address from his
client); Ost-West-Handel Bruno Bischoff GmbH, v. M/V Pride of Donegal, 1997 WL 231126, at 2
(S.D.N.Y.) (granting sanctions where numerous documents “not communications with any client” were
withheld and no privilege log was provided).
394
See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dean, 813 F. Supp. 1426, 1429 (D. Ariz. 1993) (testimony concerning the
precautions taken to maintain the confidentiality of a memo quoted in a newspaper article was sufficient to
meet the burden of showing non-waiver); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dept. of Energy, 617 F. 2d 854, 863
388
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determinations395 other waivers are either controversial,396 rest on unsettled law,397 or are
highly fact dependent.398 Indeed, even where a waiver as to a specific communication is
unarguable, the extent of the implied waiver as to other privileged communications on the
same subject is a determination subject to both varying legal tests and the specific facts of
the case.399 In these more problematic areas of waiver, assertions of non-waiver are
likely to be viewed as colorable and non-frivolous. However, the existence of a waiver
has been viewed as sufficiently non-controversial to justify sanctions in cases where
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (claimant of privilege bears the burden of showing that confidentiality after
communication, a “fundamental prerequisite to assertion of the privilege,” was maintained).
395
See Rothstein & Crump, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES at 159 (describing “express waiver,
failure to assert the privilege, or voluntary disclosure” as “relatively unproblematic concepts”). See also, In
re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, 227 F.R.D. 227, 231-232 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (information disclosed to
expert witness constitutes voluntary waiver of privilege and “specious and frivolous” motion to protect
information justified award of attorneys fees from counsel and client jointly and severally); E.E.O.C. v.
Exel, Inc., 190 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1180 (E.D.Mo. 2002) (granting fee and cost sanctions where client
voluntarily answered early deposition questions about communications with his attorney, then claimed
privilege as to later questions).
396
The issue of whether voluntary disclosure of privileged information to a government agency results in
waiver of privilege in all future settings, sometimes described as selective waiver, has produced three
different approaches in the federal courts, see Epstein, FOURTH EDITION SUPPLEMENT TO THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE at 76-85 (collecting
cases in which courts in the Federal, First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth circuits held that
selective waiver is a total waiver; in which courts in the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
held that selective waiver was not a waiver in other settings; and in which courts in the First, Second and
Seventh Circuits held or suggested that selective waiver would not waive privilege if an agreement or
protective order to that effect was put in place at the time of the selective waiver). The encroachment on
attorney-client privilege created by the combination of the no-selective-waiver approach and the expanding
coercive practice of government agencies to demand privileged information in exchange for “cooperation
credit” in criminal and regulatory investigations recently triggered the formation of an American Bar
Association Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege. See REPORT OF ABA TASK FORCE ON
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 1, 12–21.
397
Epstein, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 309-16 (collecting cases illustrating the three
different approaches to inadvertent disclosure waiver: usually waived, usually not waived, waiver
dependant on five-factor analysis of the circumstances of the disclosure). It should be noted that within
particular jurisdictions, the approach taken to inadvertent disclosures may well have reached the status of
settled law, however, a frivolous claim would only appear possible in jurisdictions following the most harsh
approach, as the possibility of maintaining privilege despite an inadvertent disclosure is either quite likely
in the “usually-not-waived” jurisdictions or is arguable on the facts in the “five-factor-analysis”
jurisdictions).
398
Waivers made by corporate officers and employees and client representatives such as attorneys are
dependent on a determination that the waiving actor had authority to make the waiver, which is a very factdependent determination. See Rothstein & Crump, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 147 –50 &
n. 2, 4-8 (collecting cases finding authorization of non-officer corporate employee waivers even though this
authority “is normally exercised by its officers and directors,” as well as cases finding lack of authorization
of corporate officer waivers; cases finding attorney waivers both authorized and unauthorized by clients;
and cases finding trustee waivers for individual bankrupts always authorized, never authorized, and
sometimes authorized).
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counsel expressly stated that privilege was waived as to particular subject400 or where
advice of counsel was made an issue in this401 or previous litigation.402
The preceding consideration of the case law involving unsuccessful claims of
privilege reveals that specific guidance can be provided concerning the danger of
substantively frivolous claims in certain areas of attorney-client privilege in which the
law is relatively straightforward and settled. Other kinds of claims, discussed above,
remain either controversial or too fact-dependent to allow for useful generalizations. We
also saw that while courts have imposed sanctions upon attorneys who made such
substantively frivolous claims, they have also been sympathetic to lawyers whom they
saw as genuinely struggling with the intersection between ethical duties of confidentiality
and legal duties of disclosure, and have vacated sanctions imposed by lower courts.403
However, as these issues are increasingly brought to and clearly resolved by state
supreme courts and federal appellate courts, it will become more difficult for attorneys to
be seen as making these claims in good faith unless they both acknowledge the existence
of the contrary controlling case law and make non-frivolous arguments for distinction or
reversal. Thus, a comment to the Model Rules which seeks to heighten lawyers’
sensitivity to the possibility of making frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege should
include concrete examples of claims of privilege that are generally agreed to be legally
unsupportable.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED COMMENT

399

See id. at 159, 183-85 (noting that the extent of an implied waiver as to the same subject matter as the
communication expressly, voluntarily or involuntarily waived is interpreted more broadly by some courts
and less broadly by others).
400
McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 275, 284-5 (N.D. Ca. 1991)
(imposing monetary sanctions upon attorneys who instructed witnesses not to answer deposition questions
on matters squarely within an express waiver provided by them).
401
E.g., Government Guarantee Fund of the Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corporation, 177 F.R.D. 336, 343
(D.V. I. 1997) (imposing sanctions where attorney in litigation waived privilege previously established by
providing information regarding his advice in opposition to motion for summary judgment).
402
E.g., Amway Corp.v. The Proctor & Gamble Co., 2001 WL 1818698 at 3 & 12 (W.D. Mich.)
(magistrate recommended establishment of a negative fact as a sanction for meritless claims of privilege
that included, among other claims, documents for which privilege had previously been found waived
because “at issue” in a prior case).
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In a society with a complex legal system and laws unintelligible to non-experts,
attorney-client privilege is essential to the possibility of vindicating rights and
maintaining liberties. It is not the intention of this Article to suggest either that the law of
attorney-client privilege is too expansive or that the ethical duty to assert attorney-client
privilege should be reined-in. Rather, this Article seeks to strengthen the privilege
against attacks by the executive, the legislature or even the judiciary by ensuring that
claims of privilege are seen as a legitimate part of legal representation and not a mere tool
for abuse of the system. This requires lawyers to exercise the judgment and minimal selfrestraint required in other areas of the law to avoid making frivolous claims. With
privilege comes responsibility. The following proposed comment to Model Rule 3.1
attempts to articulate this responsibility, but it is insufficient on its own. Legal education
must also take seriously the importance of developing competence and judgment in the
law of attorney-client privilege.

PROPOSED COMMENT TO MODEL RULE 3.1.
The ethical duty of confidentiality requires lawyers to assert all non-frivolous claims
of attorney-client privilege. At the same time, frivolous claims of attorney-client
privilege undermine the proper function of the adversary system. Lawyers must be
aware that it is also unethical to make a frivolous claim of attorney-client privilege.
The evidentiary burden is on the claiming party to show the evidence sought falls
within the attorney-client privilege. Ethics requires that lawyers avoid claims of
attorney-client privilege that are substantively frivolous and/or are made in a
frivolous manner.
A claim is made in a frivolous manner if made:
(1) without factual investigation, as appropriate under the circumstances,
sufficient to show that facts supporting the basic legal elements of privilege
are present;
(2 ) made without taking all necessary steps, including legal research, to ensure
that the lawyer has the foundational and specialized legal knowledge of the
law of attorney-client privilege relevant to this specific claim of privilege;
(3) without engaging in a competent legal analysis applying the law of privilege
relevant to this claim to the facts discovered by the required factual
investigation: and
(4) made in violation of a court rule or order requiring the provision of specific
403

See e.g., In Re Original Grand Jury Investigation, 733 N.E.2d at 1139-40 (vacating contempt and
monetary sanctions for the attorney who refused to turn it over to a grand jury on the ground that there was
a good faith argument that ethical obligations prohibited the disclosure).
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facts relevant to privilege and/or a demonstration that the legal elements
privilege are met by these facts.
A claim of privilege will be substantively frivolous if made :
(1) with essential facts missing;
(2) based on ignorance or misreading of the law of privilege;
(3) while failing to acknowledge and appropriately distinguish controlling
adverse authority;
(4) based on a change or reversal of existing law without providing argument and
support for such a change; and
(5) for typical documents or communications that are routinely viewed as nonprivileged, such as
(a) communications that seek non-legal advice or seek no legal advice, as
is the case with scheduling communications, transmittal letters, and
documents sent both to lawyers and non-lawyers not agents of the
lawyer;
(b) communications not made to lawyers qua lawyers, such as regarding
tax preparation;
(c) non-communications, such as objects, ordinary observations, and
underlying information;
(d) specific communications viewed as not ordinarily made for the
purpose of getting legal advice, such as ordinary client identity,
location and billing information,
(e) communications not made in confidence, such as made in presence of
third parties or intended to be disclosed;
(f) communications not made by the client; or
(g) where privilege as to these communications has been expressly waived
by counsel or where advice of counsel has been put at issue.
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